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<~ 
v. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COM 1 N, 
STATE of N.Y. 
State/Civil 
SUMMARY: The case presents a First Amendment challenge to 
the prohibition of all customer bill inserts that express a 
------------------~----------------utility 1 s view on "controversial matters of public policy.u 
FACTS: The Public Service Com 1 n of N.Y. directed all 
public utilities subject to its jurisdiction to "discontinue 
the practice of utilizing material inserted in bills rendered 
to customers as a mechanism for the 
- 2 -
utility's position on controversial matters of public policy." 
The principal justification for this policy was the Com'n's 
belief that 
"using bill inserts to proclaim a utility's viewpoint on 
controversial issues (e~n~~the stoc~holder 2~ i t 
in f 1 ) is tantamount to taking advantage of a ~ap~ ve 
a~ce, since the consumer cannot avoid receiving the 
literature with the utility's message. Regardless of 
whether consumers read the material, it is basically , unf air 
to subject ratepayers who disagree with the utility's 
viewpoint to the arguments of the utility through its 
billing mechanism." 
HOLDING BELOW: The N.Y. Ct. of App. rejected Con. Ed. 's 
challenge to the PSC's directive. The court found the 
administrative action well within the PSC's broad control over 
It discerned no 
transgression of First Amendment values in what was viewed 
essentially as a time-place-and-manner regulation since the PSC 
policy left open numerous alternative means of communication, 
fostered the important governmental interest of protecting 
members of a "captive audience" from the expression of views 
with which they might not agree, and did not discriminate 
against persons of any particular viewpoint. The court 
maintained that the regulation, properly viewed, was not 
content oriented since it "endeavors, in an objective and 
evenhanded manner, to limit billing insert materials to the 
innocuous and noncontroversial." 
CONTENTIONS: Appellant utility asserts that its First 
Amendment right to communicate on issues of public importance 
has been significantly impaired. The regulation is assertedly 
content oriented and is supported by no important governmental 
interest. 
The PSC counters that the regulation is a permissible 
- 3 -
subject matter restriction, that it imposes only a minimal 
burden on Con. Ed., that it fulfills important governmental 
interests, and is sufficiently specific to survive due process 
scrutiny. 
DISCUSSION: My approach to this case differs markedly from 
that of the N.Y. Ct. of App. First, I would inquire whether a 
utility company has any First Amendment interest in using 
customer bills as a mode of expression. I find none whatever. 
? I Transmission of the customer bill is a function in which the utility is totally regulated by law. We may assume arguendo 
that the corporation acting on behalf of its investors has a 
First Amendment interest in otherwise expressing its vi e\vs 
through the mails, or through other medium. First Nat'l Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Nevertheless, an 
absolute prohibition on insertion in the customer bill of any 
,? 
I 
information other than essential billing material would offend 
no First Amendment values. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 
(1976) (no public right of access to Fort Dix). 
The question, then, reduces to whether the First Amendment 
is offended by the manner in which the PSC has granted 
affirmative authorization to use the customer bill as a forum 
for the expression of views. 
The only bona fide contentions are those of discriminatory 
application and vagueness. Appellant's status as a public 
utility dissipates the discriminatory application argument. 
~o The utility has an absolute monopoly on access to its 
'------.. 
~1..----- customers' bills. There is no viewpoint other than the •' ~* 
utility's in favor of which application of the PSC regulation 
~~ could d1'scr1'm1·nate. The utility has complete control over what 
~· 
[Tv" 
·.r . .. 
- " . 
( 
- 4 -
views it expresses in the allowed insert material, and if it is 
displeased with the slant of the material that the PSC allows 
to be enclosed in the bill, the utility has the option to 
curtail all use of the billing insert and to send its views to 
the customer under separate cover. 
The vagueness contention is also without merit. There may 
be ambiguity to the phrase "controversial matters of public 
policy," but is is simple enough for the utility to ask the PSC 
whether a proposed insert transgresses the policy. There is no 
prospect of the utility finding itself subject to penalty for 
an offense committed without adequate notice. 
Varying approaches may be taken to this problem, and the 
N.Y. Ct. of App. chose to tackle the First Amendment analysis 
that would be required if the utility could claim, ab initio, 
some protected right of access to use the customer bill as a 
mode of expression. On its own terms, the lower court's 
reasoning appears to be flawed. The regulation does appear to 
be content oriented, though, as noted, it would survive 
concerns about discriminatory application by virtue of the 
utility's monopoly status. Further, it seems unlikely that the 
government could claim the "captive audience" rationale as an 
"important governmental interest" in this context. The 
government may intrude to protect privacy interests when 
requested to by the unwilling recipient of material through the 
mails, but it may not interdict all such communication on the 
basis of objection by a subclass of recipients. Compare Rowan 
v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding statute 
permitting postmaster, at the request of the addressee, to 




advertisements) with Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 
(1965) (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring postmaster 
to intercept all foreign mailings of "communist political 
propaganda" and deliver same only at the express request of the 
addressee). 
The case does not seem to present a new First Amendment 
question and may be resolved without inquiring into the First 
Amendment rights of corporate entities, but the approach of the 
N.Y. court seems incorrect under the circumstances of this case. 
There is a motion to dismiss or affirm. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 79-134, Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission, and No. 79-565, Consolidated Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission 
1. ISSUES PRESENTED. In No. 79-134, the question is 
whether the resp may constitutionally prohibit utilities from 
communicating their views to consumers on "controversial matters 
of public policy" by means of bill inserts. In No. 79-565, the 
question is whether the resp may constitutionally prohibit 
utilities from engaging in advertising which promotes the use of 
electricity. 
2. DISCUSSION. 
A. No. 79-134. The background of this case is not 
2. 
extensive. After receiving communications from public interest 
groups who claimed that the petr's use of bill inserts to 
promulgate its views on the use of nuclear energy was unfair, 
resp pro!:j. b W d p~r from exposing its views on "controversial 
m:!;er~_,:~cy" through bill inserts. As their name 
suggests, bill inserts are placed in the bills that petr sends 
out to each of its customer. The New York Court of Appeals 
upheld the prohibition. The court reasoned that the ban was a 
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction that merely 
prevented the petr from using one avenue of speech. The court 
stated that petr had alternative avenues of expression, that 
consumers constituted a captive audience, that the bill inserts 
intrusively entered consumers' homes, and that the restriction 
was not content oriented because it prohibited all discussion on 
controversial public issues rather than only one side of a 
controversial public issue. 
As an initial matter, there can be no question that the 
First Amendment protects the petr's speech even though it is a 
corporation. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 u.s. 765, 
785-786 (1978). If, as the state court found, the ban on bill 
inserts is a valid time, place, or manner restriction, then the 
resp need only show that it is a reasonable regulation. If the 
ban is not a time, place, and manner restriction, then the state 
must demonstrate a substantial state interest that justified the 
suppression of speech. 
3. 
I do not believe that the restriction is a valid time, 
place, or manner regulation. A time, place or manner restriction 
must not be based upon the content of communication. Linmark 
Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94 ( 1977); llc•-e......uy 
Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 ( 1975); ~ · 
police Department v. Mosely, 408 u.s. 92, 99 (1972). Thus, the 
classic example of a valid time, place or manner restriction 
would a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of soundtrucks 
in residential areas between midnight and 6 a.m. Cf. Kovacs v. 
cooper, 336 u.s. 77 (1943). Although the regulation surely 
infringes some speech, it is not based on either the subiect 
matter nor the point of view of the speaker. This regulation, by 
:..:.:..::. is free to p romulgate bi .. ll l ;;;-
inserts discussing non-controversial ters, but is not ~ 
free to ~oversial issues of public importance. u 1ci-
Resp contends, however, that this Court has allowed ~$ 
~ 
See Young ~ American Mini 
contrast, is content based. 
some content-related restrictions. 
Theaters, 427 u.s. 50 (1976); 4 24 u.s. 828 Greer v. Spock, .......... 
(1976); Lehmann~ Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Rowan v. 
Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). In my view, none of these 
cases support the classification of the bill insert ban as a 
time, place, or manner restriction. Indeed, three of the cases 
can be distinguished easily. In Rowan the Court held 
constitutional a statute allowing a person to remove his name 
from a mailing list. I suppose that Rowan would support a 
4. 
regulation that would prohibit petr from sending bill inserts to 
consumers who had informed petr that they did not wish to 
receive the inserts. Rowan merely recognizes that the right of 
Free Speech does not encompass the right to speak to compel 
persons to listen. But Rowan demands that an individual 
unequivocally remove his name from a mailing list. Rowan neither 
gives the resp the right to decide whether consumers are 
unwilling readers, nor rests on the use of content-neutral time, 
place or manner restrict ions. Both Greer and Young involved 
content-related restrictions that were justifiable because they 
were supported by a substantial governmental interest unrelated 
to the suppression of speech. In Greer, the recognized interest 
was military discipline; in Young the governmental interest was 
the prevention of the deterioration of commercial neighborhoods, 
..; 
see 427 U.S. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring) 
The more difficult cas; to distinguish is Lehmann v. ~ L1ec-­
Shaker Heights, from which you dis sen ted. That case presented d 
the question whether a city that operates a public transit 
system and sells advertising space for car cards was required to 
accept paid political advertisements. In a plurality opinion, 
Justice Blackmun concluded that the car cards were not a public 
forum, and, therefore, the city did not have to afford equal 
access to all advertisers. Justice Douglas concurred in the 
judgment on the ground that the subway riders were a captive 
audience. These rationales are inapplicable to this case. First, 
5. 
neither opinion justified the ban as a time, place, and manner 
restriction. Second, the plurality explictly distinguished 
billboard from newspaper or radio advertisements because "[t]he 
radio can be turned off, but not so the billboard or street car 
placard." 418 u.s. at 302. Justice Douglas asserted the same 
distinction. 418 U.S. at 308. Insofar as the distinction is 
relevant here, the bill inserts are more 1 ike a newspaper ad, 
which can be easily disposed of, than 1 ike the billboard in a 
subway car, which can less easily be avoided. Your opinion for 
the Court in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, specifically 
treated Lehmann as a case involving captive audiences, but not 
time, place or manner regulation. 422 U.S. at 209. In sum, I do 
not believe that the resp's order constitutes a content-neutral 
time, place, or manner restriction. 
Consequently, the bill insert ban cannot be upheld 
unless the resp asserts a substantial interest that justifies 
the suppression of speech. First National Bank ~ Bellotti, 435 
U.S. at 786. In my view, none of the resp's asserted interests 
rise to this magnitude. The resp contends that the consumers are 
a captive audience that need not be subjected to petr's 
political views. But the consumers are perfectly free to dispose 
of the bill insert or to avoid reading those portions of the 
bill insert devoted to political views. A person is not 
"captive" simply because he must avert his eyes from 
objectionable material. See Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 
6. 
422 u.s. at 208-211; Cohen v. California, 403 u.s. 15, 21 
(1971). Second, resp argues that this communication is intrusive 
because it violate the privacy of the home. Yet receipt of a 
bill insert is surely no more intrusive than constitutionally 
protected door-to-door soliciation. See Village of Schaumberg v. 
Citizens for A Better Environment, No. 78-1335, slip op. at 18 
(Feb. 20, 1980); Martin v. Struthers, 319 u.s. 141 (1943). 
Third, resp argues that petr has an alternative means of 
communication. But the presence of an alternative means does not 
by itself constitute a compelling state interest in favor of 
suppression of speech. Nor is the existence of an alternative 
forum sufficient to justify suppression of speech on other 
grounds. Schneider~ State, 308 u.s. 147, 163 (1939). Fourth, 
resp argues that there is only a limited amount of space in each 
billing envelope, and space must be saved for more important 
messages. Limited resources will justify a infringment on First ; , 
Amendment interests, see Red Lion Broadcasting ~ FCC, 395 U.S. 
367 (1969), but the resp has filed to make a sufficient showing 
that space is so limited as to justify its restriction. 
Resp also contends that the absolute ban is necessary 
to prohibit consumers from being forced to subsidize petr's 
views. If the petr pays for only the cost of the bill insert, 
presumably it will get a free ride on the cost of the envelope 
and postage. But the resp has made no effort in this case to 





shareholders. Accordingly, this Court is in no position to 
decide whether an allocation can be made that would not force 
consumers to subsidize petr's speech. Even if such an allocation 
could not be made, it is not obvious that a free ride would I£?: 
justify suppression of petr's speech. 
The resp argues that such subsidization of petr's ~ 
. 
speech is prohibited by the rule of Abood v. Detro1 t Board of 
Education, 431 u.s. 209 (1977), in which the Court held that a 
union may not compel a teacher to contribute to the support of 
an ideological cause he may oppose in order to retain public 
employment. I believe that Abood may not necessitate such a 
result. In that case, the union's viewpoint could not have been 
transformed into a "public forum." For example, it would destroy 
the effectiveness of a union lobbyist to force him to support a 
piece of legislation 75% of the time, and oppose it 25% of the 
time. The only method of protecting the dissident members was to 
allow them to demand the refund of their dues. But whenever a 
taxpayer contributes toward the construction of a public forum 
open to speakers of different viewpoints, he is, in some sense, 
forced to support some views in which he may not believe. Yet, 
the public forum doctrine demands equal access, not suppression - - -
of views. See Lehmann v. Shaker Heights, 418 u.s. at 316 
(Brennan, J., with whom Stewart, Marshall & Powell, JJ., 
joined). It is possible, therefore, that consumer subsidization 
of bill inserts would transform them into a public forum to 
8. 
which equal access must be given. I do not believe, however, 
that the possibility of consumer subsidization is a substantial 
state interest that justifies the prohibition on consumer 
inserts. In sum, I'--_c_o_n_c_ l _u_d_e __ t_h_a ... t __ t_h_e __ P ... r_o_h_i_b_l_· t_ i _o_n __ o_n __ c_o_n_s_u_m_er (~ 
ression of speech. 
Petr also argues that the resp's order is void of 
vagueness. Under my analysis, this issue need not be reached. 
Assuming, however, that the ban on bill inserts does not violate 
the First Amendment, then I believe that the order is not 
unconstitutionally vague. The order proscribes discussion of 
"controversial matters of public policy." This standard is no 
more vague than the standard that requires broadcast station to 
present opposing viewpoints on "controversial issues of public 
importance." In Red Lion, supra, the Court held that standard 
was not constitutionally vague. 395 U.S. at 395-396. 
X X X 
B. No. 79-565. In addition to the ban on bill inserts, 
resp has banned "pEo~otional advertising" 
-W ~.....-. z""'twa,..... IIW44 
by electric 
companies. The New York Court of Appeals held that the 
prohibition is constitutional. The court recognized that 
promotional advertising is a form of commercial speech subject 
v 
to some constitutional protection. Relying upon Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass'n, 436 u.s. 444 (1978), the court upheld the ban. 
The court noted that the petr is a regulated monopoly and stated 
that "it is difficult to discern how the promotional advertising 
of electricity might contribute to society's interest in 
'informed and reliable' decisionmaking." The court also justifed 
the ban because of its ameliorative effect on the consuptiom of 
energy during the current energy crisis. 
The ban on promotional advertising quite clearly 
affects commercial_ s_Eeech. In four major opinions, this Court 
L ,....,~ -w~ 
has enunciated the protections due commercial speech. In 
Virginia States Board of Pharmacy ~ Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) the Court held that that the State 
could not prohibit pharmacists from advertising the prices of 
prescription drugs. In concluding that the advertising of prices 
was protected the Court noted upon the pharmacists' economic 
interest, and identified the consumers' interest in alleviating 
pain and enjoying the basic necessities of life, and society's 
interest in promoting the effecient allocation of resources. In 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 ( 1977), the Court 
relied upon a similar survey of interests to hold that the 
truthful advertising of prices at which routine legal services · 
will be performed is also protected by the First Amendment. 
In Ohral ik ~ Ohio State Bar Ass~' your opinion for 
the Court held that an attorney's attempts to solicit customers 
in person was not protected by the commercial speech doctrine. 
The Court noted that in-person solicitation may convey helpful 
information, but that it also places pressure on the customer to 
accede to the lawyer's wishes. Moreover, the state had a 
compelling state interest in preventing in-person solicitation. 
The Court noted the ABA' s contention that a prohibition on 
sol ici tat ion reduces the 1 ikel iehood of overreaching, protects 
the privacy of persons, and avoids situations where a lawyer's 
judgment will be clouded by his pecuniary self-interest. In 
vliriedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S.1 (1980), your opinion for the Court 
held that a Texas ban on the use of tradenames by optometrists 
did not violate the First Amendment. The Court recognized that 
the commercial speech doctrine does not protect misleading or 
deceptive speech, and upheld the judgment of the Texas Optometry 
Board that the use of tradenames left a 
competition. 
misleading impression of 
~ ft_e.-c.• c rtr-
~ 
The common theme of all four cases is that commercial 
speech which increases the ability of consumers to make informed 
judgments is protected, but speech which attempts to take 
advantage of consumers is not. Thus, the Court has upheld the 
promulgation of price information through advertisements in 
Virginia State and Bates, but held that the commercial speech 
doctrine does not protect trade practices which may harm the 
consumer, Ohralik, or may be misleading, Friedman. In this case, 
there is no claim that the speech is either misleading or is 
conveyed in a manner that would overreach the will of the 
consumer. Thus, the specific rationales behind Ohralik and 





Nevertheless, it is not certain that the protections of ~ 
State and Bates apply. In both cases, the Court relie~ 
~ 
~
on the consumers' interest in making economically rational 
decisions, and society's interest in rational distribution of 
resources. And in both cases, the Court treated the State 
attitude essentially as misguided paternalism in attempting to 
keep helpful information away from consumers. In neither case, 
did the State suggest that the transaction itself, either the 
purchase of the drugs or retention of an attorney, was an 
economic transaction that should not be encouraged. ~ 
,,. ~~ a. Lf......-
This case is substantially different. First, electric ~r( 
ut i1 i ties a;::--;::;:;:;ed -:-onop: l ;:-;h us , the pet r' s d i ffere
is slightly different from the position of sellers in Virginia ~ 
State and Bates. Because the petr is a monopoly it does not have 
as strong an interest in promoting its product as commercials 
enterprises that operate in a free market. Additionally, the 
consumer of electrical power has no strong interest in learning 
what petr charges for electricity because he cannot transfer his 
business to a different utility if prices are too high. Even if 
the consumer chooses to compare the desirability of electrical 
energy with alternative energy sources, the comparison will 
never wholly replicate a free market because the price of 
electricity is set by a regulatory commission and not by market 
forces. Second, society's interest in e ff,ec ient allocation of 
"' 
resources has already been displaced by the decision to regulate 
electrical utili ties as monopolies. Because the government has 
replaced the free market as the regulator of petr' s economic 
'"-· 
success, society has a less compelling interest is insuring the 
free flow of promotional advertising. Of course, the electrical 
utilities do not monopolize energy resources, and there may be,~ 
some competition between el~ctrical utilitigs ~d~il or natural ~~ 
gas compan~. B~-excep;--for those people who are deciding what-form of heating system to place in a house or are buying a new 
house, I believe the competition is very limited. Most persons 7 .. 
deciding whether to put in an air conditioner or to buy a new ~;EJ ~ 
1473~ 
household appliance will not be able to choose among energy ~ . 
2,, 2. ,IJfc ci./w. 
sources. It seems to me, therefore, that the consumer's interest~ 
 
and the societal interest in promoting the use of electicity is 
) not~trong as ensuring the flow of price information in a 
1(~\ free market. 
Moreover, in this case the State interest rests on a 
more substantial basis than fears that consumers will misuse 
information. In this case, unlike Virginia State and Bates, the 
State believes that the economic transaction, the use of more 
---- -, r-s ~twa= ...-.. ..... 
power, should be discouraged. In this sense, the case resembles 
__....._ .. ------
those in which the State at tempts to serve a legitimate non-
speech-related interest through a means that infringes upon 
speech. See Procunier v. Martinez. In 1 ight of the national 
energy crisis, I believe that the State has a substantial 
iQ!erest in discouraging the use of electricity. Of course, the 
State could choose a more direct means of accomplishing this 




providing service to new customers, or it could demand that 
existing supplies of power be rationed. But the State presumably 
hopes that voluntary economic activity will obviate the 
necessity for such prohibitions, and believes that a ban on 
promotional advertising will cut down on consumer demand. 
I believe that this is a close case, because it demands ~ 
a balancing of First Amendment interests in the promulgation of 
commercial speech against the State's interest. I lean to the 
view, however, that the ban is lawful. Because of the position 
~•4"1.,_,. 
of the petr as a natural monopoly, neither the petr, consumers
nor society have the same interest implicated in Virginia State 
and Bates. Moreover, the State has a strong interest in 
conserving scarce natural resources. Thus, I would be inclined 
to affirm. 
It has been argued that the commercial speech doctrine 
'P~ 
as a whole is fatally flawed, and that Virignia State' rests u~on Q~ 
1\ ,-- -
economic due process grounds. See Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial~ 
Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. 
Rev. 1 (1979). Although I would not be prepared to concede that 
no first amendment interests are protected by the decision in 
Virginia State, I agree with the authors that the Court's 
opinion "emphasized the adverse economic effects of Virqnia' s 
ban against drug advertising." Id., at 25. Consequently, I would 
be reluctant to apply the commercial speech doctrine in this 
case in which efficient allocation of resources will not be 
I "to 
significantly improved by promotional advertising, and in which 
the State has a legitimate interest in promoting energy 
conservation. 
Petr claims that the prohibition is void for vagueness 
and violates equal protection. I believe that neither contention 
is compelling. Although the phrase "promotional advertising" may 
be susceptible of varied meanings, I do not believe the phrase 
is so standardless that "men of common intelligence must guess 
at its meaning." Connolly~ General Construction, 269 U.S. 385, 
391 (1926). Furthermore, the resp has stated that it will advise 
the petr whether specific advertisements fall within the ban. 
Although such pre-clearance might be unconstitutional as applied 
to "pure" speech, it is permissible as applied to commercial 
speech. Cf. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456. The prohibition is said to 
violate equal protect ion because other energy users are not 
prohibited from advertising their services. I do not believe the 
strict First Amendment-Equal Protection standard of Police 
Department ~ Mosely need apply to this case. Here, the resp 
only has responsibility to regulate electrical utilities and it 
its decision rests upon a rational basis. I do not believe the 
order violates equal protection. 
3. SUMMARY. The question in No. 79-134 is whether the 
resp may constitutionally prohibit utilities from communicating 
their views to consumers on "controversial matters of public 
policy" by means of bill inserts. Because the prohibition is not 
1::>. 
content-neutral, the ban on bill inserts cannot be justified as 
a valid time, place or manner regulation. None of the asserted 
governmental interests, including the protection of captive 
audiences and intrusiveness into private homes, is substantial 
enough to justify suppression of political speech. In No. 79-
565, the question is whether the resp may constitutionally 
prohibit utilities from engaging in advertising which promotes 
the use of electricity. This prohibition affects commercial 
speech, which is afforded some, but not all, of the protections 
of "pure" speech. Although the question is close, I am inclined 
to believe the ban is justifiable. Because petr is a regulated 
monopoly, the interests in encouraging an efficient free market 
which were relied upon in Virginia State are not as convincing 
here. Furthermore, the resp has a strong interest in 
discouraging excess energy usage. 
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't'O: Jon DATE: April 28, 1980 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
", 79-134 Consolidated · Edison 
'r 
' i'' 
Your draft of 4/23, that I reviewed Saturday with 
some care, is impressive. It reflects a vast amount of 
careful work, and a thorough understandinq of the First 
Amendment cases. 
Althouqh we - and most of the Justices - view this 
as an easy case in terms of the right answer, it is not as 
easy case to write. The difficulty sterns primarily, I 
believe, from the multiplicity of the grounds or arqurnents 
advanced in support of the Commission's action. I must sav 
that trying to sort these out into some consistent pattern of 
analysis, rather than a piecemeal and multitudinous bit-by-
bit analysis, is quite difficult. 
I will use this memorandum as a mode of "thinking 
outloud" about the draft, and as to possible ways to tighten 
it up. I may not proceed in a logically, as I have made no 
outline of the draft. ' 
• 1 
~· I start with the Conclusion: 
• "The State action is neither a valid time, place 
~ nor manner restriction, a oer.missihle subiP.ct 
matter regulation, nor a prohibition iustified bv a 
compelling state interest." 
,, -~ 
2. 
~f{' ~J ~~ 
' '· 
I bear in mind these three broad possible 





)::· .:~ ~·· 
~his part states the case well and with commendable 
brevity. 
II 
fl· .; ' The first paragraph disposes of any thouqht that 
corporate speech is not protected. ThP-re is no reference in 
this paragraph to the fact that Con Eo is a regulated 
monooly. You do touch on this later. At some ooint in the 
opinion, I think perhaps we should address this specifically, 
perhaps saying near the end of the opinion that apart from 1 
the specific arguments advanced bv the Commission, it asserts 
no per se right to control speech by virtue of petitioner's 
monopl y. ~~ /1; -,.l:. 1' 11;.: ' ,· '!" 
The remainder of Part II is a summary of basic 
First Amendment doctrine, with the focus on the type of pure 
speech at issue here. These paragraphs are quite good. 
,, · ., ~he draft of Part II concludes bv notinq that we 
~.. must consider "whether the state can demonstrate" that its 
regulation is a permissible regulation on speech. 
' ,I ',. III 
This part (o. 6-8) addresses the time, place or ~ 
•. 












,,· ,, 3. 
.,. 
manner arqument. /'; 
Subject to my Rider A, p. 8 (revisinq the paraqraph 
on that paqe), Part III looks qood to me- subiect to what is 
said hereinafter. 
IV 
At this point, I would expect the ~raft to move 
directly to the second principal arqument advanced by the 
Commission. On the basis of the conclusion in Part VI, I 
would expect this to arque that the Commission's ban is 
permissible subiect matter requlation, and this portion of 
the draft does move into that argument. 
But I don't quite follow the combination of the 
lead paraqraph at the bottom of paqe 8 and the discussion of 
authorities on paqe 9. The draft comes to "subiect matter 
regulation" in subpart A (p. 10), when it mentions obscenity, 
libel, and commercial speech. The paragraph also mentions 
Chaplinsky. I have thought of it as essentially a time, 
place or manner speech, althouqh perhaps it falls into the 
subiect matter cateqory also. Apart from this minor point, 
the two paraqraphs under subpart A dispose neatly of. the 
subject matter distinctions or exceptions that are mentioned. 
Subpart S of Part IV discusses the exception that allows 
subject matter regulation on the use of government propertv 
or facilities. I have not checked the Commission's briefs, 
., . 
4. 
but if it relies seriously on the property cases, perhaps we 
must meet the argument. I view it is as quite frivolous for 
the reasons you state. I would prefer not to dignify the 
argument by devoting so much attention to it. There is no 
use of government property or facilities here. As you note, 
even though regulated, Consolidated Edison is a private 
company and the only "property" used are its envelopes. 
Subject to your views, Jon, I am inclined to dispose of such 
reliance as the Commission may make on this arqument, in a 
footnote simply identifying the specific cases cited by the 
Commission and noting they are wholly inapposite. 
On paqe 14, at the very end of the discussion of 
the "property or facilities" argument, the draft notes the 
legitimate state interest in requlatinq a public utility's 
activities. I would think, however, that the reference to 
the state interest in regulating a utility monoply perhaps 
should be left to the last paragraph before the final 
conclusion in our opinion. The state regulatory interest 
unlies each of the separate arguments advanced by the 
Commission1 it is not simply related to 
facilities point. 
v 
This Part presents an analytical oroblem for me 
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. . , 
\ ... 
!h"'' . '1i: _.\' ~· '<t 
5. 
,. 
"compelling state interest" argument that I met in Rellotti. 
Returninq again to the summary sentence on page 19 (the 
requlation is not a valid, time, place or manner restriction, 
a permissible subiect matter regulation, nor a prohibition 
justified by a compellinq state interest). Do you view the 
"compelling state interest" arqument as separate from the 
other two categories of cases? I suppose one could say -
although I do not recall the cases beinq analyzed this way -
that a time or place restriction is valid when supported only 
by a compelling state interest. Similarily, perhaps the same 
~ could be said for some of the "subiect matter regulation" 
;>;, 
cases. I suppose the truth is that the numerous First 
Amendment cases cannot be cabined easily into separate 
compartments analytically. "-'-1\1: ;•iK•; ~ 
The specific arquments considere~ in Part v seem to 
be more or less of a "hodge podqe". They include "captive 
audience", "limited resources", and "subsidizinq" of the cost 
of bill inserts. Without havinq reread the cases, I do not 
recall that many of them cited turned specifically on 
comoellinq state interest analysis. In any event, I do not 
view any of these particular arquments as havinq the 
slightest merit. And however we treat them I hope we can 
condense the present draft. For example, certainly the 






The "limited resource" arqument is irrelevant to this case in 
any realistic sense, and also could he allocated to a 
footnote. Yet, I hope we can find some way to cut the 
footnotes back. I would like to avoid the appearance of 
writing a First Amendment law review as the Court has done 
this on numerous occasions - thouqh not as well as you could 
do it. 
l .. ~· 
,t-
·"{i.f 
* * * 
I am sure, by the time you reach this point, you 
are wondering what I would suqgest. In truth, I am not sure 
and think we should talk about it. Tentatively, I think I 
would be inclined to consider a restructinq alonq the 
following lines. ·~·- " 
~ Leave Parts I and II substantially as they 
If, in reworking the remainder of the opinion, there is a 
case that we want to be sure to emphasize, it could be moved 
perhaps into Part II. 
Rather than divide the basic argument into Parts 
III, IV and V, what would you think of simply having a Part 
III, with perhaps two or three subparts. At the beqinning of 
Part III, we might state that a number of arguments are 1 \1 !i, ~ 
' 
advanced by the Commission and the Court below in support of 
the regulation. ; If true, we could say that we commence with 
the time, place or manner argument as being the one most 
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seriously urged. After a preliminary sentence, we could put 
this argument in subpart A. 
Suboart B could include each of the other specific 
argument, either in the text or in footnotes. Perhaps all of 
these could he characterized as arguments in which the 
Commission or the Court below attempts to SU'IJPOrt the 
regulation as a valid exception to otherwise permissible 
speech, or as you have stated it in the conclusion "a 
permissible subject matter regulation". 
Unless the Commission talks about the "subiect 
matter rlistinctions" mentioned on paqe 10 of the draft, I 
would be inclinen to omit reference to them - at least in the 
text. This leaves the following arguments: that requlating 
the use of a utility's billinq envelope i~ analogous to 
regulating the use of government propertv or facilities: and 
the "captive audience", "limited resources", and "subsidized" 
arqument now in Part v. My recollection is that these last ... "'. 
three arguments, together with the time, place or manner 
argument, were the centerpieces of the Commission's brief and 
oral arguments - plus the overall! contention that the 
state's interest in regulating an electric monopoly is 
compelling. If my recollection is correct I would address 
these specific arguments in Part III - putting all of them in 














concluding - perhaps in a brief Part IV - as I did in 
. ~ .. . 
Bellotti that neither the record in this case nor the 
authorities relied upon by the Commission justifies any 
conclusion that this requlation of speech content is .. 
compellinq. 
•:z!. 
~~ :•. . 
f.' .• 
. , ~. •, .. ,.,,. 
If you care to try it, Jon, would it be helpful for 
~~:· . 
you in liqht the foreqoinq observations, and particularly 
your own far qreater understanding of this case, to prepare a 
skeleton outline of a possible revision of the draft. We 
could use it for the basis of discussion. 
L.F.P., 
" ... ,. 
ss 
J' 
INSERT TWO NO. 79-134 Add to Footnote 12 
The Commission stated that even if costs were 
allocated, utilities would be able to monopolize 
the billing process in order to present their 
positions on public issues. But the Commission 
expressly rejected the suggestion of the NRDC that 
it regulate this "monopoly" by imposing an equal 
access requirement on the billing envelopes. 
~ LA..- l.uJ_ ~ 
Accordingly, we--a~s.i.a.er ~a. ' 
-
~Commission order forcing Consolidated Edison to 
~ present balanced views on public issues in its bil 1 
J 
inseE._ts would viol~e the First Amendme~\· See 
Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 u.s. 241 (1974)~ 
Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications 
395 u.s. 367 (1969). 
lfo/ss 1 /2A/AO ~ioer A, p. 5 (ron Ed) 
The national nee~ to ensure Rn a~eauate enerqy sunplv for the 
future is not disputed. There are, however, stronqly held 
oif~erina views as to whether - an~ to wh~t extent, i~ at ~11 
- nuclear power should be relien uoon as an enerqv source. 
In the mailinq that triqqered the requlation at issue, 
Consolidated Edison advocated the use of such power for the 
qeneration of electrical enerqy and discounted its danqer. 
Appellees opoose the resort to this enerqy source, believinq 
that its potential danqer to health and life outweiqhs the 
contribution to enerqy independence. The Commission thus hao 
undertaken, by the exercise of its requlatorv power, to limit 
the means by which Concolidated P.dison may oarticipate in the 
public debate on this issue of national interest and 
importance. 
It is clear, therefore, that the speech inhibited 
... 
,. 
,~ " , 
.. 










'' •. .. .. , ... 
.. 
2. 
by the Commission's requlation is that most clearly entitled 
to the fullest protection of the First Amendment. Yet, this 
conclusion does not end our inquiry. See First National Bank 
of Boston v; Bellotti, supra, at 786. There are 
circumstances in which even political speech may be 
requlated. (Jon: cite cases). We therefore now consider 
whether in this case the state can demonstrate that its 
requlation is permissible . 
lfP/SS 4/28/80 Rider ~i P~ R· (Con Ed) 
l. 
The Commission's prohibition is not a permissible 
'· 
I 
time, place, or manner requlation because it makes no 
pretense of beinq content-neutral. Indeed, it has undertaken 
to requlate speech because it does address a controversial ·~···' . ' 
·;t;' 
issue of public policy. The Commission would allow bill 
•' ..... 
inserts that present certain kinds of information to 
'1>:., ,· 
consumers, such as enerqy conservation measures, but forbids 
(. 
the use of inserts that discuss public controversies. The 
'· 
Commission, with commendable candor, iustifies its ban 
.. ~ . 
,·, 
orecisely on the qround that consumers of electricity will 
.. 
benefit from receivinq "useful" information hut mav be harmed~ ' 
by receipt of the prohibited information. See Aop. to 
•. 4"' 
Jurisnictional Statement, at 43a, 66a-67a. 
IV .' 
We now turn to a second iustification for its ban. 
'• . ,. 
2. 
Stated broadly, it is contended that its action is a 
permissible subiect matter requlation. It is true that in 
narrowly focused circumstances we have recoqnized excePtions 
to the qeneral prohibition aqainst subject matter 
restrictions. 
Jon: If I understand that outline of vour draft, 
it is substantially as follows: Part II dispeses, in a 
paraqraph, of the "corporate speech" question. 
. 
•"' 
lfp/ss 4/28/80 Rider Ai p. · 18 (Con · Ed) 
The Commission makes two further arquments. It 
observes that a billing envelope can accommodate only a 
limited amount of information, and that the public interest 
would be better served if the available space were used to 
promote enerqy conservation, safety or to remind consumers of 
their riqhts. Red Lion Broadcasting v; ·Federal 
Communications Commission, 395 u.s. 366 (1969) is cited in 
support of this arqument. In that case, the Court recoqnized 
the necessity of government regulation of the limited 
frequencies available to radio and television broadcasters. 
We find little analogy between the expansive availability o£ 
the United States postaqe system and the severe limitations 




















lfo/ss 4/2A/80 Rider A, p. 17 · (Con Ed) 
It hardly can be asserted seriously that the billinq inserts 
at issue intrude siqnificantly on privacy. The mails, thanks 
to favorable postaqe rates, do indeed carry an overabundance 
of solicitations, advertisements, appeals for contributions, 
and various types of propaqandizinq. To be sure a utility 
bill comes first class and one fails to open it at his peril. 
Yet, if an enclosure is unwelcome it is no areat deprivation 
to d~posit it in the nearest wastebasket. 
(~: I view this particular arqument as facially 
frivolous, and would qive it the back of our hand. Perhaps ~ , 
• 
the citation to Martin v~ Struthers could be dropped to a 
footnote. Or you could add one sentence to the above, 
citizinq Martin• 
lfp/ss 5/5/80 Rider ~, p. 1 (Con Ed) 
The question in this case is whether the First 
Amendment is violaten by an orner of the Public Service 
Commission of the State of New York that prohibits the 
inclusion in monthly electric bills of inserts that discuss 
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lfp/ss 5/5/AO Rider ,.· B, p. 1 · (Con Eo) 
The bill insert stated Consolidated Edison's views 
on "the benefits of nuclear power", statinq that they "far 
outweiqh any potential risk" and that nuclear power plants 
are safe, economical and clean. It was contended that 
increased use of nuclear enerqy wouln further this country's 
independence from foreiqn enerqy sources. 





But there is no comparison between the limited number of 
broadcast frequencies and the unlimited availahility of the 
United States mail for dissemination of information. We nee0 
not consid~r whether the Commission has authority to order 
Consolidated F.dison to employ bill inserts or other means to 
promote cons~rvation, safetv or some other Purpose ~eemed by 
the Commission to be worthy. Cf. Central ·Hudson -Gas & 
Electric ·Corp. v• Public .. <;ervice · Commission, supra, decided 
todav. Suffice it to say that in the narrowest sense a 
sinqle billinq envelope is a "limited resource", but on the 
record before us there is no showinq that even the standard 
billinq envelope could not enclose additional information if 
Consolidated F.dison were lawfully ordered to do so. More 
fundamentally, unlike broadcast frequencies, numerous 
communication means are ~vailable to Condolidated Edison, to 
' , .. 
-.• . 
,. 









' 'I ., . 
' ,. 
, . . 
2. 
the Commission itself, to Natural Resources Defense Council, 
and to anyone else interesterl in these subiects.* 
*In addition to the mails, all elements of the media are 
available for advertisements. 
* 
" ~ ... 
~ 
. . 
: . ~ 
• d 
lfo/ss 5/6/80 Rider A, P• 1 · (Central Hudson) 
This case presents the question whether a 
requlation of the Puhlic Service Commission of the state of 
New York is violative of the First Amendment because it 
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lfp/ss 5/6/80 Rider A, p. 17 (Central Hudson) 
We come finally to the critical inquiry in this 
case: whether the ~ Commission's complete suppression 
of speech normally protected by the First Amendment is a 
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lfp/ss 5/6/80 Rider A; p. 20 (Central Hunson) 
We are not unmindful of the national interest in 
enerqy conservation. We accept without reservation the 
arqument that conservation, as well as the development of 
alternate energy sources, is an imperative national aoal. 
Administrativ~ hodies empowered to requlatP. electric 
utilities, such as the New York Cornmission,~he authority 
~ 
-- and indeed the -- to take appropriate action to further 
~ 
this qoal. hen, however, suchaction involves the 
supnression of sneech, the First Amendment requires that the 
han be no more extensive than is necessarv to serve the state 
interest. In this case, as we have shown ahove, the record 
before us fails to show that the total ban on promotional 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-134 
Consolidated Edison Company 
of New York, Inc., 
Appellant, 
v. 
Public Service Commission of 
New York. 
On Appeal from the Court of 
Appeals of New York. 
[May -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether the First Amendment 
is violated by an order of the Public Service Commission of 
the Sta.te of New York that prohibits the inclusion in monthly 
electric bills of inserts that discuss controversial issues of 
public policy. 
I 
The Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Con-
solidated Edison), appellant in this case, placed written 
material entitled "Independence Is Still a Goal, and Nuclear 
Power Is Needed To Win The Battle" in its January 1976 
billing envelope. The bill insert stated Consolidated Edison's 
views on "the benefits of nuclear power," stating that they 
"far outweigh any potential risk" and that nuclear power 
plants are safe, economical and clean. App., at 35. It was 
contended that increased use of nuclear energy would further 
this country's independence from foreign energy sources. 
In March 1976, the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. (NRDC) requested Consolidated Edison to enclose a 
rebuttal prepared by NRDC in its next billing envelope. I d., 
at 45-46. When Consolidated Edison refused, NRDC asked 
the Public Service Commission of the State of New York 
79-134-0PINION 
2 CONSOLIDATED EDISON v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM'N 
(Commission) to open Consolidated Edison's billing envelopes 
to contrasting views on controversial issues of public impor-
tance. Id., at 32-33. 
On February 17, 1977, the Commission, appellee here, denied 
NRDC's request, but prohibited "utilities from using bill 
inserts to discuss political matters, including the desirability 
of future development of nuclear power." Id., at 50. The 
Commission explained its decision in a Statement of Policy on 
Advertising and Promotion Practices of Public Utilities issued 
on February 25, 1977. The Commission concluded that with 
respect to bill inserts Consolidated Edison customers are a 
captive audience of diverse views who should not be subjected 
to the utility's beliefs. Accordingly, the Commission barred 
utility companies from including bill inserts that express "their 
opinions or viewpoints on controversial issues of public policy." 
I d., at 43a. The Commission did not, however, bar Consoli-
dated Edison from sending bill inserts discussing topics that 
are not "controversial issues of public policy." The Commis-
sion denied petitions for rehearing filed by Consolida.ted Edi-
son and other utilities. Id., at 59a. 
Consolidated Edison sought review of the Commission's 
order in the New York state courts. The State Supreme 
Court, Special Term held that the order violated the First 
Amendment. 93 Misc. 2d 313, 402 N. Y. S. 2d 551 (1978). 
But the State Supreme Court, Appellate Division reversed, 63 
A. D. 2d 364, 407 N.Y. S. 2d 735 (1978), and the New York 
Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 47 N. Y. 2d 94, 
390 N. E. 2d 749 (1979). The Court of Appeals held that 
the order did not viola.te the First Amendment because it was 
a valid time, place, and manner regulation designed to protect 
the privacy of Consolidated Edison's customers. Id., at 106-
107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. We noted probable jurisdiction, 
- U. S. - (1979). We reverse. 
II 
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ground that Consolidated Edison is not entitled to the protec-
tions of the First Amendment. In First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), we rejected the con-
tention that a State could confine corporate speech to specified 
issues. That decision recognized that " [ t] he inherent worth 
of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public 
does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether cor-
poration, association, union or individual." I d., at 777. Be-
cause the state action limited protected speech, we concluded 
that the regulation could not stand absent a showing of a 
compelling state interest. /d., at 786.1 
The First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no 
State shall "abridg[e] the freedom of speech." See Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-501 (1952). Free-
dom of speech is "indispensible to the discovery and spread of 
political truth," Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 
(1927) (Brandeis, J. , concurring), and "the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market .. : ." Abrams v. United States, 250 
U. S. 616, 630 ( 1919) (Holmes, J. , dissenting) .2 The First 
Amendment removes "governmental restraints from the arena 
1 Nor does Consolidated Edison's status as a privately owned but gov-
ernment-regulated monopoly preclude its assertion of First Amendment 
rights. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
No. 79-565 slip op., at- (1980). We have recognized that the speech 
of heavily regulated businesses may enjoy constitutional protection. See, 
e. g , Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1 (1979); Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Council, 425 U. S. 748, 763-765 (1976). 
Consolidated Edison's position as a regulated monopoly does not decrease 
the informative value of its opinions on critical public matters .· See 
generally Public Media Cente1· v. FCC, - U. S. App. D. C. - , 587 F. 
2d 1322, 1325, 1326 (1978) ; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Berkley, 
60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 127-129 (1976). 
2 Freedom of speech also protects the individual's interest in self-
expression. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 777, 
n. 12 (1978); see T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6 
(1970) , 
79-134-0PINION 
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of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views 
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the 
hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more 
capable citizenry and more perfect polity .... " Cohen v. 
California, 403 U. S. 15, 24 (1971).3 
This Court has emphasized that the First Amendment 
"embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and 
truthfully all matters of public concern .... " Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101-102 (1940); see Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966). The Commission's prohibition of 
discussion of controversial issues of public policy thus strikes 
at the heart of the freedom to speak. In the mailing that 
triggered the regulation at issue, Consolidated Edison advo-
cated the use of nuclear power. The Commission has limited 
the means by which Consolidated Edison may participate in 
the public debate on this issue, and other controversial issues 
of national interest and importance. 
III 
The Commission's ban on bill inserts is not, of course, 
invalid merely because protected speech is infringed. See 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 786. We 
must consider whether the State can demonstrate that its 
regulation is a permissible limitation on speech. The Com-
mission's arguments requires us to consider three theories that 
might justify the state action. We must determine whether 
the prohibition is (i) a reasonable time, place, or manner 
restriction, (ii) a permissible subject-matter regulation, or 
(iii) a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state 
interest. 
A 
This Court has recognized the validity of reasonable time, 
place, or manner regulations that serve a significant govern-
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mental interest and leave ample alternative channels for com-
munication. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 
U. S. 85, 93 (1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 771 
(1976); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, at 104 (Black, J., 
dissenting). In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 563 (1941), 
this Court upheld a licensing requirement for parades through 
city streets. The Court recognized that the regulation, which 
was based on time, place, or manner criteria, served the munic-
ipality's legitimate interests in regulating traffic, securing pub-
lic order, and insuring that simultaneous parades did not pre-
vent all speakers from being heard. !d., at 576. Similarly, 
in Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972), we upheld an 
antinoise regulation that prohibited demonstrations that 
would diEturb the good order of an educational facility. The 
narrowly drawn restriction constitutionally advanced the city's 
interest "in having an undisrupted school session conducive 
to students' learning .... " !d., at 119. Thus, the essence 
of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recognition 
that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, 
may frustrate legitimate governmental goals. A roving sound-
truck that blares at 2:00 a. m. disturbs neighborhood tran-
quilitv no matter what its message. 
A time, place, or manner restriction may not be based upon 
the ron tent of speech. See Linmark, supra, at 93-94: see also 
Parn'sh v. Unit·ersity of M 1'ssovri Curators, 410 U. S. 667, 670 
( 1973) (per curiam). A restriction that regulates only the 
time, place, or manner of speech mav be imposed constitu-
tionally so long as it is reasonable. But when regulation is 
based upon the content of speech, governmental action must 
be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication 
has not been prohibited "merely because public officials dis-
approve the speaker's views." Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 
U. S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the 
result). See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 
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209 (1975); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92, 99 (1972).4 
The Commission does not pretend that its action is unre-
lated to the content of bill inserts. Indeed, it has under-
taken to prohibit certain bill inserts precisely because they 
address a controversial issue of public policy. The Commis-
sion allows inserts that present certain kinds of information 
to consumers, such as energy conservation measures, but it 
forbids the use of inserts that discuss public controversies. 
The Commission, with commendable candor, justifies its ban 
on the ground that consumers will benefit from receiving "use-
ful" information but may be harmed by receipt of the pro-
hibited information. See App. to Jurisdictional Statement, 
at 66a-67a. The Commission's own rationale demonstrates 
that its action ca.nnot be upheld as a content-neutral time, 
place, or manner regulation. 
B 
The Commission next argues that its order is acceptable 
because all mention of controversial public issues in bill 
inserts, and not just Consolidated Edison's opinions, has been 
suppressed. The prohibition, the Commission contends, is 
related to subject-matter rather than to the views of a par-
ticular speaker. That is, the Commission's prohibition bars 
all discussion of nuclear power, whether pro or con, in bill 
inserts. Because the regulation does not favor one side of a 
political controversy over another, the Commission asserts 
that it is constitutionally permissible. 
But ~he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regu-
lation extends not only to restrictions on opinion, but also 
to suppression of public discussion of an entire topic. "[T] he 
First Amendment means tha.t government has no power to 
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter or its content." Police Department v. Mosley, supra, 
4 See also Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 
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at 95. See Cox v. Louisiana, supra, at 580-581 (Black, J., 
dissenting). In Mosley, we held that a municipality could 
not exempt labor picketing from a general prohibition on 
picketing at a school even though the ban would have reached 
both pro- and antiunion demonstrations. If the marketplace 
of ideas is to remain free and open, governments must not be 
allowed to choose "which issues are worth discussing or debat-
ing .... " 408 U. S., at 96. See also Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, supra, at 214-215 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines 
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 510-511 (1969). To allow a 
government to select permissible subjects of public debate 
would be to allow that government to control the search for 
political truth. 
In limited circumstances, however, governmental regula• 
tion may be based upon the subject-matter of speech.5 The 
court below relied upon two cases in which this Court has 
recognized that the government may bar from its facilities 
certain speech that would disrupt the legitimate governmental 
purpose for which the property has been dedicated. 47 
N. Y. 2d, at 107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. In Greer v. Spack, 424 
U.S. 828 (1976), we held that the Federal Government could 
prohibit partisan political speech on a military base even 
though civilian speakers had been allowed to lecture on other 
5 For example, when courts are asked to det{'rmine whrther a Rpecies 
of speech is covered by the First Amendment, tlwy must look to the 
content of the expression. See Central Hudson v. Public Service Com-
mission, No. 79-565, slip op., at - (1980) (commercial speech); Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. N ew Hampshire, 
315 U. S. 568, 572-573 (1942) (fighting words). Compare Federal 
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 746-
747 (1978) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) and Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, 427 U. S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) with Fed-
eral Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, supra, at 761 
(opinion of PowELL, J.); id., at 762-763 (BRENNAN J., dissenting); and 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, supra, at 87 (STEWART, J., dissenting) 
(indecent speech) . 
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subjects. Sec id., at 838, n. 10.6 In Lehmann v. Shaker' 
Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.), 
a plurality of the Court similarly concluded that a city transit 
system that rented space in its vehicles for commercial adver-
tising did not have to accept partisan political advertising. 
The municipality's refusal to accept political advertising was 
based upon fea.rs that partisan advertisements might jeopard-
ize long term commercial revC'nue, that commuters would be 
subjected to political propaganda, and that acceptance of 
particular political advertisements might lead to charges of 
favoritism. !d., at 302, 304.7 
Greer and Lehmann are viewed properly as narrow excep-
tions to the general prohibition aga.inst subject-matter dis-
tinctions. In both cases the Court was asked to decide 
whether a public facility was open to all speakers.8 The· 
plurality in Lehmann, like the Court in Greer, concluded that 
the functioning of governmental facililities would be disrupted 
6 The necessity of excluding partisan speerh waR based upon the tra-
ditional policy "of krrping official military activities ... wholly free of 
entanglement with partiRan political campnignR of any kind." !d. , at 839·. 
Thus, the Court's drcision construed the public right of access in light 
of "the unique character of the Govrrnment property upon which the 
expression is to take place." !d., at 842 (PowELL, J., concurring). 
1 Mr. Justice Douglas, who concurred in thE' restdt in Lehmann, did not 
view "the content of the m0ssnge as rrlevant either to the petitioner's 
right to expre.<(,<; it or to the commuterf'' right to br free from it." 418 
U. S., at 308. Rather , Ju tire Doup:lns UJ1held the municipality's actions 
because commuters were a captivr audience. !d., at 306-308. The Con-
solidated Edison customers who receive bill insrrts are not a similarly 
captive audience. See infra, at 12-13. Four Member;; of the Lehmann 
Court dissented on the ground that. the municipality could not discrimi-
nate among users. 418 U. S., at 308, 309 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
8 Lehmann and Greer represent only one category of this Court's cases 
dealing with rights of access to governmental property. Compare Tinker 
v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S., at 512-513, and !!ague v. Com-
mittee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516 (opinion of 
Roberts, J.), with Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
' · I 
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unduly if they were used for partisan political speech but not 
for other forms of speech. 
But the analysis of Greer and Lehmann is not applicable 
to this case. In both cases, a private party asserted a right of 
access to public facilities. Consolidated Edison has not asked 
to use the offices of the Commission as a forum from which 
to prornulga.te its views. Rather, it seeks merely to utilize 
its views on controversial issues of public policy. To be sure, 
the State has a ligitirnate regulatory interest in controlling 
Consolidated Edison's activities, just as local governments 
have always been able to use their police powers in the public 
interest to regulate private behavior. See New Orleans v. 
Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). But the Corn-
mission's attempt to restrict the free expression of a private 
party cannot be upheld by reliance upon precedent that rests 
on the special interests of a government in overseeing the use 
of its property. 
c 
Where, as here, government restricts the speech of a private 
person, the state action may be sustained only if the govern-
ment can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means 
of serving a compelling state interest. See First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 786; Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam); see also Bates v. Little 
Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960).0 The Commission argues 
0 The Commission contends that its order should be judged under the 
standard of United States v. O'B1'ien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), because 
it "is only secondarily concerned with the subject matter of Consolidated 
Edison communications .... " Brief for Appellee, at 9, n. 3. The O'Brien 
Court stated the test for the constitutionality of regulations that inci-
dentally infringe speech where "the governmental interest is unrelated to 
the suppre~sion of free expression .... " 391 U. S., at 377. The bill 
insert prohibition does not further a governmental interest unrelated to 
the suppression of speech. Indeed, the court below ju tified the ban 
expressly on the basis that speech might be harmful to consumers. 47 
N. Y. 2d, at 106-107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. 
,. 
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that the prohibition is necessary (i) to avoid forcing Con-
solidated Edison's views on a captive audience, (ii) to allocate 
limited resources in the public interest, and (iii) to ensure 
that ratepayers do not subsidize the cost of the bill inserts. 
The State Court of Appeals based its approval of the pro-
hibition largely upon its conclusion that the bill inserts 
intruded upon individual privacy.10 The court stated that 
because consumers have no choice whether they receive the 
insert and the views expressed in the insert may inflame their· 
sensibilities, the Commission could act to protect the privacy 
of the utility's customers. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 106-107, 390 N. E. 
2d, at 755. But the Court of Appeals erred in its assessment 
of the seriousness of the intrusion. 
Even if a short exposure to Consolidated Edison's views 
may offend the sensibilities of some consumers, the ability of 
government "to shut off discourse solely to protect others from 
hearing it [is] dependent upon a showing that substantial 
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolera-
ble manner." Cohen v. California, 403 U. S., at 21. A less 
stringent analysis would permit a government to slight the 
First Amendment's role "in affording the public access to dis-
cussion, debate and the dissemination of information and 
ideas." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., 
at 783; see Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). 
10 The State Court of Appeals also referred to the alternative means by 
which Consolidated Edison might promulgate its views on controversial 
issues of public policy. Although a time, place, and manner restriction 
cannot be upheld without examination of alternative avenues of communi-
cation open to potential speakers, see Linmarlc Associates v. Willingbom, 
supra, at 93, we have consistently rejected the suggestion that a govern-
ment may justify a content-based prohibition by showing that spe'lkers 
have alternative means of expression. See Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc, 425 U. S. 748, 757, n. 15 (1976); 
Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 556 (1975): 
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Where a single speaker communicates to many listeners, 
the First Amendment does not permit the government to 
prohibit speech as intrusive unless the "captive" audience can-
not avoid objectionable speech. 
Pa:::sengers on public transportation, see Lehmann v. Shaker 
Heights, 418 U. S., at 307-308 (Douglas, J., concurring in 
the judgment), or residents of a neighborhood disturbed by 
the raucous emissions of a passing soundtruck, see Kovacs v. 
Cooper, supra, may well be unable to escape an unwanted 
message. But customers who encounter an objectionable 
billing insert ma.y "effectively avoid further bombardment of 
their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Cohen v. 
California, supra, at 21. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405, 412 (1974) (per curiam). So may the customer of Con-
solida.te Edison avoid exposure to objectionable material 
simply by transferring the bill insert from envelope to 
wastebasket.11 
The Commission also contends that because a billing enve-
lope can accommodate only a limited amount of information, 
the public interest would be better served if the available 
space were used to promote energy conservation or safetv. or 
to remind consumers of their lega.l rights. This Court has 
recognized that allocation of limited resources, s11ch as r"dio 
and television broadcast frequencies, may allow the govern-
ment to exercise unusual authority over speech. See Red 
11 Although this Court ha.~ recognizE'd the snecial privacy interests that 
attach to persons who seek seclusion within thE'ir own homes, see Rowan 
v. Post Office Department, 397 U. S. 728, 737 (1970), the arrival of a 
billing envelope is hardly as intrusive as the visit of a doer-to-door so-
licitor. Yet this Court has rejected the contention that a municipality 
may ban door-to-door solicitors became they may invade the privacv of 
hnuseholds. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 146-147 (1943). Ev~n 
if there were a compelling state interest in protecting consumers against 
overly intrusive bill inserts, it is prs~ible that the State could achieve its 
goal simply by requiring ConPolidated E<hon to refrain from dE'livering 
bill inserts to the homes of objecting customers. See Rowan v. Post 
Office Department, supra. 
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Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 
395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Commission has not demonstrated, 
however, that billing envelopes are a limited resource com~ 
parable to the radio spectrum. And the Commission has 
failed to show that the presence of bill inserts devoted to dis-
cussion of public issues precludes the inclusion of other bill 
inserts in a single billing envelope. Unlike radio stations 
broadcasting on a single frequency, multiple bill inserts will 
not result in a cacophony of unintelligible voices. Consum-
ers can select those inserts or portions of an insert that they 
wish to read. And the space within a envelope for bill inserts 
may be expanded simply by purchase of more postage or larger 
envelopes. 
Finally, the Commission urges that its prohibition would 
prevent ratepayers from subsidizing the costs of policy-
oriented bill inserts. But the Commission's order was not 
based on its inability to allocate costs between the share-
h0lders of Consolidated Edison and the ratepayers. Rather, 
the Commission stated "that using bill inserts to proclaim a 
utility's viewpoint on controversial issues (even when the 
stockholder pays for it in full) is tantamount to taking ad-
vantage of a captive audience .... " App. to Juris. St., at 
43a (emphasis added). Accordingly, there is no basis on this 
record to assume that the Commission could not exclude the 
cost of these bill inserts from the utility's rate base.12 Mere 
speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling state 
interest. See Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 389 
U.S. 217, 222-223 (1967).13 
12 In its denial of petiticns for rehearing, the Commission re-emphasized 
that it would impose the ban without regard to allocation of costs between 
shareholders and ratepayers. App., at 67a, n . 1. The Commission stat ed 
that even if costs were allocated, utilities would be able to monopolize the 
billing process in order to present their positions on public issues. 
13 The Commission also contends that ratepayers can not be forced to 
support the costs of Consolidated Edison's bill inserts. Because the Com-
mission has failed to demonstrate that such costs could not be allocated 
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IV 
The Commission's prohibition on bill inserts that discuss 
controversial issues of public policy directly infringes speech 
that is protected by the First Amendment. The state action 
is neither a valid time, place, or manner restriction, a permis-
sible subject-matter regulation, nor a prohibition justified by 
a compelling state interest. Accordingly, the regulation must 
be invalidated. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U. S., at 795. 
The decision of the New York Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
between shareholders and ratepnyers, we have no occasion to decide 
whether the rule of Abood v. Detroit BoaTd of Education, 431 U. S. 209 
(1977), would prevent Consolidated Edison from passing onto ratepayers 
the costs of bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public policy. 
lfP/ss 5/8/80 Rider A, p. q (Con Ed) 
The analysis of Greer ann Lehmann is not applicable 
to the Commission's requlation of hill insert~. In both of 
those cases a private oarty asserted a riqht of access to 
public facilities. The Commission makes no claim in this 
case thAt the hillina envelope is oublic property. It does 
assert that the enveloPe, as a necessary adiunct to the 
operations of a privately own~o but extensivelv reaulateo 
utility, may be controlled hv the state. To he sure, the 
state has a leqitimate regulatory interest in controllina 
Condolidated Edison's activities, just as local qovernments 
always have been able to a~sert their police powers in the 
public interest to reaulate private behavior. Ree New 
Orleans v. · Duke, 427 u.s. 297, 303 (1975)(Per Curiam). But 
the power to requlate utility service in the public interest. 
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an important "issue" of public POlicy. 
·. 
Jon: I have thouaht a qood deal about vour insert one for 
paqe 9 that. raises and refutes thf' "stette action" Point. I ., 
prefer not to ad dress it in the opinion we circulate. It .• 
seems wholly remote from the qpock and Lehmann araument. If 
raised by the dissent, we can meet it then. I would not 
obiect to a footnote that cites Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co. sirnplv as an example of the fAct that a public 
;• 
utilitv subiect to extensive requlation is not an arm of the 
state or its actions equivalent to state action. 
.· 
•. 
lfp/ss 5/8/80 Rieter A, p. · 11 (Con F:d) 
Reliance is placed upon the Court's decision in Red · Lion 
Rroadcastinq v. Federal Communications -Commission, 395 u.s. 
367 (1966), in which the Court recoqnized that allocation of 
extremely limiten rec;ource~, such as radio and television 
broadcast freauencies, may allow the qovernment to exercise 
unusual authority over speech. This reliance is misplaced. 
There is no comparison between the limited number of 
broadcast freouencies and the unlimited availability of the 
United States mail for the dissemination of information, a 
means available to the Commission itself, to Natural 
Resource~ Defense Council, and indeed to anyone else 
interested in e~pousinq a cause. It can be said that a bill 
insert is a particularly convenient or effect means of 
reachinq utility customers. It is not, however, a limited 
public resource such as broadcast freauencies. Rather, it is 
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a mailinq by a private thouqh requlaten party in a way that 
does not preclude reasonable comparable means of 
. 
< 
communication. Moreover, on the record before us there is no 
showinq that even the standard billina envelope could not 
enclose additional information if Consolidateo F.dison were 
·, 
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Appeals of New York. 
[May -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether the First Amendment 
is violated by an order of the Public Service Commission of 
the Sta~e of New York that prohibits the inclusion in monthly 
electric bills of inserts discussing controversial issues of public 
policy, 
I 
The Consolidated Edison Company of New York, appel-
lant in this case, placed written material entitled "Independ-
ence Is Still a Goal, and Nuclear Power Is Needed To Win 
The Battle" in its January 1976 billing envelope. ' The bill 
insert stated Consolidated Edison's views on "the benefits of 
nuclear power," saying that they "far outweigh any potential 
risk" and that nuclear power plants are sa.fe, economical, and 
clean. App., at 35. The utility also contended that increased 
use of nuclear energy would further this country's independ-








In March 1976, the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. (NRDC) requested Consolidated Edison to enclose a 
rebuttal prepa.red by NRDC in its next billing envelope. I d., 
at 45-46. When Consolidated Edison refused, NRDC asked 
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to open Consolidated Edison's billing envelopes to contrasting 
views on controversial issues of public importance. I d., at 
32-33. 
On February 17, 1977, the Commission, appellee here, denied 
NRDC's request, but prohibited "utilities from using bill 
inserts to discuss political matters, including the desirability 
of future development of nuclear power." Id., at 50. The 
Commission explained its decision in a Statement of Policy on 
Advertising and Promotion Practices of Public Utilities issued 
on February 25, 1977. The Comm·ission concluded that Con-
solidated Edison customers who receive bills containing inserts 
are a captive audience of diverse views who should not be 
subjected to the utility's beliefs. Accordingly, the Commis-
sion barred utility companies from including bill inserts that 
express "their opinions or viewpoints on controversial issues 
of public policy." Id. , at 43a. The Commission did not, 
however, bar utilities from sending bill inserts discussing 
tqpics that are not "controversial issues of public policy." 
The Commission later denied petitions for rehearing filed by 
Consolidated Edison and other utilities. Id., at 59a. 
Consolidated Edison sought review of the Commission's 
order in the NPw York state courts. The State Supreme 
Court, Special Term, held that the order violated the First 
Amendment. 93 Misc. 2d 313, 402 N. Y. S. 2d 551 (1978). 
But the State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed, 63 
A. D. 2d 364, 407 N.Y. S. 2d 735 (1978), and the New York 
Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 47 N. Y. 2d 94, 
390 N. E. 2d 749 (1979). The Court of Appeals held that 
the order did not violate the First Amendment because it was 
a valid time, place, and manner regulation designed to protect 
the privacv of Consolidated Edison's customers. Id .. at 106-
- 107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. We noted probable jurisdiction, 
- U. S. - (1979). We reverse. 
II 
· The restriction on bill inserts cannot be upheld on the 
·. 
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ground that Consolidated Edison is not entitled to the protec-
tions of the First Amendment. In First National Bank of 
Boston v. BelloW. 4~5 U.S. 76.") (1978), we rejeded the con-
tention that a State could confine corporate speech to specified 
issues. That decision recognized that "[t]he inherent worth 
of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public 
does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether cor-
poration, association, u~ion or individual." I d., at 777. Be-
cause the state action limited protected speech, we concluded 
that the regulation could not stand absent a showing of a 
compelling state interest. Id., at 786.1 
The First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no 
State shall "abridg[e] the freedom of speech." See Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 500-501 ( 1952). Free-
dom of speech is "indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth," Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 
( 1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and "the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market .... " Abrams v. United States, 250 
U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).2 The First 
Amendment removes "governmental restraints from the arena 
1 Nor does Consolidated EdLon's status as a privately owned but gov-
ernment regulated monopoly preclude its assertion of First Amendment 
rights. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, No. 79-565 slip op., at 8-9 (1980). We have recognized that the 
speech of heavily regulated busineo:ses may enjoy constitutional protection. 
See, e. g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763-765 (1976). 
Consolidated Edison's position as a regulated monopoly does not decrease 
the informative value of its opinions on critical public matters. See 
generally Public Media Center v. FCC, - U. S. App. D. C.-, 587 F. 
2d 1322, 1325, 1326 (1978); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Berkeley, 
60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 127-129 (1976). 
2 Freedom of speech also protects the individual's interest in self-
expression. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 777, 
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of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views 
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the 
hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more 
capable citizenry and more perfect polity .... " Cohen v. 
California, 403 U. S. 15, 24 (1971).3 
This Court has emphasized that the First Amendment 
"embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and 
truthfully all matters of public concern .... " Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101-102 (1940); see Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) . In the mailing that triggered the 
regulation at issue, Consolidated Edison advocated the use 
of nuclear power. The Commission has limited the means 
by which Consolidated ~cyson may participate in the public 
debate on this question} and other controversial issues of 
national interest and importance. Thus, the Commissio'n's 
prohibition of discussion of controversial issues strikes at the 
heart of the freedom to speak. 
III 
The Commission's ban on bill inserts is not, of coPrse, 
invalid merely because it infringes protected speech. See 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 786. We 
must consider whether the State can demonstrate that its 
regulation is a permissible limitation on speech. The Com· 
mission's arguments require us to consider three theories that 
might justify the state action. We must determine whether 
the prohibition is (i) a reasonable time, place, or manner 
restriction, (ii) a permissible subject-matter regulation, or 




This Court has recognized the validity of reasonable time, 
place, or manner regulations that serve a significant govern~  
8 Sec also A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 35-36 (1965}. 
,• 
79-134-0PINION 
CONSOLIDATED EDISON v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM'N 5 
mental interest and leave ample alternative channels for com-
munication. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 
U. S. 85, 93 ( 1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 771 
(1976). See also Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, at 104 (Black, J., 
dissenting). In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 563 (1941), 
this Court upheld a licensing requirement for parades through 
city streets. The Court recognized that the regulation, which 
was based on time, place, or manner criteria, served the munic-
ipality's legitimate interests in regulating traffic, securing pub-
lic order, and insvring that simultaneous parades did not pre-
vent all speakers from being heard. !d., at 576. Similarly, 
in Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 ( 1972), we upheld an nJ 
ntinoise reg·1lation~ prohibiting demonstrations that J 
ould di~turb the good order of an educational facility. The 
arrowly drawn restriction constitutionally advanced the city's 
mterest "in having an undisrupted school session conducive 
to students' learning .... " !d., at 119. Thus, the essence 
of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recognition 
that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, 
may frustrate legitimate governmental goals. No matter 
what its message"a rovin~oundtrack that blares at 2 a. m. -;.._ a,/ 
disturbs neighborhood tra.n,1quility. , \ J 
A restriction that regulates only the time, place, or manner 
of speech mav be imposed constitutionally so long as it is 
reasonable. But when regula.t;on is based upon the content 
of sneech, governmental action must be scrutinized more care-
fully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited 
"merely because public officials disarmrove the spw1ker's 
views" Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 282 (1951) 
(Fra.nkfurter, J., concurring in the result). See Erznoznik 
v. City of Jacksnnville, 422 U. S. 205. 209 (1975); Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 99 (1972).:.__--
4 See a1so Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 
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Therefore, a time, place, or manner restriction may not be 
based upon the content of speech. See Linmark Associates, 
Inc. v. Willingboro, supra, at 93- 94; see also ?apish v. Uni· 
versity of Missouri Curators, 410 U. S. 667, 670 (1973) (per 
curiam). 
The Commission does not pretend that its action is unre-
lated to the content of bill inserts. Indeed, it has under· 
taken to suppress certain bill inserts precisely because they 
address controversial issues of public policy. The Commis· 
sion allows inserts that present information to consumers on 
certain subjects, such as energy conservation measures, but it 
forbids the use of inserts that discuss public controversies. 
The Commission, with commendable candor, justifies its ban 
on the ground tha.t consumers will benefit from receiving uuse-
ful" information, but not from the prohibited information. 
See App. to Juris. St., at 66a-67a. The Commission's own 
rationale demonstrates that its action cannot be upheld as a 
content-neutral time, place, or manne·r regulation. 
B 
·The Commission next, argues that its order is acceptable 
because it suppresses ail discussion of nuclear power, whether 
pro or con, in bill inserts. '1'he prohibition, the Commission 
contends, is related to subject-matter rather than to the views 
of a particular speaker. Because the regulation does not 
favor either side of a political controversy, the Commission 
asserts that it is constitutionally permissible. 
Nevertheless, the First Amendment's hostility to ·content-
based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular 
viewpoints, but also to supression of public discussion of an 
entire topic. In Police Department v. Mosley, supra, at 95, 
we said that "the First Amendment means that government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter or its content." See Cox v. Louisiana, 
supra, at 580- 581 (Black, J., dissenting) . We held that a 
municipality ·could not exempt labor picketing from a general 
·. 
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prohibition on picketing at a school even though the ban 
would have reached both pro- and anti-union demonstrations. 
If the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open, gov-
ernments must not be allowed to choose "which issues are 
worth discussing or debating .... " 408 U. S., at 96. See 
also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 214-215 
(1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 
510-511 (1969). To allow a government the choice of 
permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that 
government control over the search for political truth. 
In limited circumstances, however, governmental regula-
tion may be based upon the subject-matter of speech.~ The 
court below relied upon two cases in which this Court has 
recognized that the government may bar from its facilities 
certain speech that would disrupt the legitimate governmental 
purpose for which the property has been dedicated. 47 
N. Y. 2d, at 107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. In Greer v. Spack, 424 
U.S. 828 (1976), we held that the Federal Government could 
prohibit partisan political speech on a military base even 
though civilian speakers had been allowed to lecture on other 
subjects. See id., at 838, n. 10.e In Lehmann v. Shaker 
5 For example, when courts are asked to determine whether a species 
of speech is covered by the First Amendment,, they must look to the 
content of the expression. See Central Hudson v. Public Service Com-
mission, No. 79-565, slip op., at 4 (1980) (commercial speech ); Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U. S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U. S. 568, 572-573 (1942) (fighting words). Compare Federal 
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 746-
747 (1978) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), and Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), with Fed-
eral Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, supra, at 761 
(opinion of PowELL, J.), id., at 762-763 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), and 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, supra, at 87 (STEWART, J., dissenting) 
(indecent speech). 
{I The necessity for excluding partisan speech was based upon the tra-
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Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.), 
a plurality of the Court similarly concluded tha.t a city transit 
system that rented space in its vehicles for commercial adver-
tising did not have to accept partisan political advertising. 
The municipality's refusal to accPpt political advertising was 
based upon fears that partisan advertisements might jeopard-
ize long term commercial revenue, that commuters would be 
subjected to political propaganda, and that acceptance of 
particular political advertisements might lead to cha.rges of 
favoritism. !d., at 302, 304.7 
Greer and Lehmann properly are viewed as narrow excep-
tions to the general prohibition against subjert-matter dis-
tinctions. In both cases, the Court was asked to decide 
whether a public facility was open to all speakers.8 The 
plurality in Lehmann and the Court in Greer concluded that 
partisan political speech would disrupt the operation of gov-
ernmental facilities even though other forms of speech posed 
no such danger. ~ 
· The analysis of Greer and Lehmann is not applicable to the/ 
entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any Jdnd." ld .. at 839. 
Thus, the Court'R decision construed the public right of access in light 
of "the unique character of the Government property upon which the 
expression is to take place." ld., at 842 (PowELL, J. , concurring) . 
7 Mr. Justice Douglas, who concurred in the judgment in Lehmann, did 
not view "the content of the message a~ rrlcvant either to the petitioner's 
right to express it or to the commuters' right to be free from it." 418 
U. S., at 308. Rather, Justice Douglas upheld the municipality's actions 
because commuters were a captive audience. !d., at. 306-308. The Con-
solidated Edison customers who receive bill insrrts are not a capative 
audience. See infra, at 10-11. Four Justices dissented in Lehmann 
on the ground that the municipality could not discriminate among 
advertisers. 418 U. S ., at 308, 309 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
8 Lehmann and Greer represent only one category of this Court's cases 
dealing with rights of access to governmental property. Compare Tinker 
v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S., at 512-513, and Hague v. Com-
mittee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516 (opinion of 
Roberts, J.), with Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
• 
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Commission's regulation of bill inserts. In both cases, a 
private party asserted a right of access to public facilities. 
Consolidated Edison has not asked to use the offices of the 
Commission as a forum from which to promulgate its views. 
Rather, it seeks merely to utilize its own billing envelopes to 
promulgate its views on controversial issues of public policy. 
The Commission assert{that the billing enve ope, as a neces-
sary adjunct to the operations of a public utility, is subject 
to the State's plenary control. To be sure, the State has a 
legitimate regulatory interest in controlling Consolidated Edi-
son's activities, just as local governments always have been 
able to use their police powers in the public interest to regu-
late private behavior. See New Orleans v. Dulce, 427 U. S. 
297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). But the Commission's at-
tempt to restrict the free expression of a private party cannot 
be upheld by reliance upon precedent that rests on the special 
interests of a government in overseeing the use of its property. 
c 
Where a government restricts the speech of a private 
person, the state action may be sustained only if the govern-
ment can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means 
of serving a ·compelling state interest. See First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 786; Buckley v. V.aleo, ~ 
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam). See also Bates v. Little, 
9 The Commission contends that its order should be judged under the 
standard of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), because 
the order "is only secondarily concerned with the subject matter of 
Consolidated Edison communications .... " Brief for Appellee, at 9, 
.._~--~n-:......::::3·:.,_.:T~he O'Brien test applies to regulations that incidentally infringe 
speec re "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression .... " 391 U. S., at 377. The bill insert prohibition 
does not further a gov·ernmental interest unrelated to the suppression ~ 
of speech. Indeed, the court below justified the ban expressly on the / 
basis that the speech might be harmful to consumers. 47 N. Y. 2d, at / 
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Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (196o)VThe Commission argues 
finally that its prohibition is necessary (i) to avoid forcing 
Consolidated Edison's views on a captive audience, (ii) to allo-
cate limited resources in the public interest, and (iii) to en-
sure that ratepayers do not subsidize the cost of the bill 
inserts. 
The State Court of Appeals largely based its approval of 
the prohibition upon its conclusion that the bill inserts in-
truded upon individual privacy.10 The court st<Jted that 
the Commission could act to protect the privacy of the util-
ity's customers because they have no choice whether to receive 
the insert and the views expressed in the insert may infi.Rme 
their sensibilities. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 106-107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 
755. But the Court of Appeals erred in its assessment of the 
seriousness of the intrusion. 
Even if a short exposure to Consolidated Edison's views 
may offend the sensibilities of some consumers, the abilitv of 
government 11 to shut off discourse solely to protect others from 
hearing it [is] dependent upon a showing that substantial 
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentiallv intolera-
ble manner." Cohen v. California, 403 U. S., at 21. A less 
~tringent analysis wonld permit a governmPnt to slight the 
First Amendment's role 11in affording the public access to dis-
CllSSion, debate and the dissemination of information and 
idPFts." First Nationnl Bank of Boston v. Bf'llotti, 435 U. S., 
at 783; see Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communication~ 
~he State Court. of Appeals also referred to the alternative means by 
whJCh Consolidated Edison might promulgate its views on ccntroversial 
issues of public policy. Although a time. place, and manner restriction 
cannot be upheld without examination of alternative avenues of rrmmuni-
cation open to potential ~peakers, see Linmark Associates v. Willingboro, 
supra, at 93, we have consi~tently rejected the suggestion that a govern-
ment may ju~tify a content-based prohibitinn bv showing that spe1kers 
have alternative means of expression. See Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc, 425 U. S. 748, 757, n. 15 (1976); 
Southeastem Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 556 (1975); 
Spen" v. W"'hi,gton, 418 U.S. 405, 411, n. 4 (1974) (P" ouriam). / 
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Commission, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, 381 U. S. 301 , 308 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). 
Where a. single speaker communicates to many listeners, 
the First Amendment does not permit the government to 
prohibit speech as intrusive unless the "captive" audience can-
not avoid objectionable speech. 
Pa~.sengers on public transportation, see Lehmann v. Shaker 
H eights , 418 U. S., at 307-308 (Douglas, J., concurring in 
the judgment), or residents of a neighborhood disturbed by 
the raucous broadcasts from a passing soundtruck, cf. Kovacs 
v. Cooper, supra, may well be unable to escape an unwanted 
message. But customers who encounter an objectionable 
billing insert may "effectively avoid further bombardment of 
their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Cohen v. 
California. sunra, at 21. See Spence v. Washin(:ltnn, 418 U. S. 
405, 412 (1974) (per curiam). The customer of Consolidated 
--.1..-..'---~E::.:d:!:i::;:s:;:on~m~a'LyJ exposure to objectionable ma.terial simply 
by transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket.11 
The Commission contends that because a billing envelope 
can accommodate only a limited amount of information , poli-
tical messages should not be allowed to take the place of in-
serts that promote energy conservation or safety, or that 
remind consumers of their legal rights. The Commission 
relies upon R ed Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communication~ ~ 
Commission, 395 U. S. 367 (1969) , in which the Court held/ 
11 Although this Court has recognized the snecial privacy interests that 
attach to persons who seek seclusi0n within their own homes, see Rowan 
v. Post Office Department, 397 U. S. 728, 737 (1970) , the arrival of a 
billing envelope is hardly as intrusive as the visit of a doer-to-door so-
licitor. Yet the Court has rejected the contention that a municipality 
may ban door-to-door solicitors because they may invade the privac:v of 
households. Martin v. Struthers. 319 U. S. 141, 146-147 (1943) . Ev·en 
if there were a compelling state interest in protec ting consumers against 
overly intrusive bill inserts, it is possible that the State could achieve its 
goal simply by requ;rir g Consolidat ed Edis0n to stop sending bill inserts 
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that the regulation of radio and television broadcast fre-
quencies permit the Federal Government to exercise unusual 
authority over speech. But billing envelopes differ from 
broadcast frequencies in two ways. First, a broadcaster com-
municates through use of a scarce, publicly owned resource. 
No person can broadcast without a license, whereas all persons 
are free to send correspondence to private homes through the 
mails. Thus, it cannot be said that billing envelopes are a 
limited resource comparable to the broadcast spectrum. Sec-
ond, the Commission has not shown on the record before us 
that the presence of the bill inserts at issue would preclude 
the inclusion of other inserts that Consolidated Edison might 
be ordered lawfully to include in the hilling envelope. Unlike 
radio or television stations broadcasting on a single frequency, 
multiple bill inserts will not result in a "cacophony of com-
peting voices." !d., at 376. 
Finally, the Commission urges that its prohibition would 
prevent ratepayers from subsidizing the costs of policy-
oriented bill inserts. But the Commission did not base 
its order on an inability to allocate costs between the share-
h0lders of Consolidated Edison and the ratepayers. Rather, 
the Commission stated ''that using bill inserts to proclaim a 
utility's viewpoint on controversial issues (even when the 
stockholder pays for it in full) is tantamount to taking ad-
vantage of a captive audience .... " App. to Juris. St., at 
43a (emphasis added). Accordingly, there is no basis on this 
record to assume that the Commission could not exclude the 
cost of these bill inserts from the utility's rate base.12 Mere 
speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling state 
interest. See Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 389 
u.s. 217, 222-223 (1967).13 
12 In its denial of petitions for rehearing, the Commission re-emphasized 
that it would impose the ban without regard to allocation of costs between 
shareholders and ratepayers. App., at 67a, n. 1. 
1a The Commission also contends that ratepayers cannot be forced to 
support the costs of Consolidated Edison's bill inserts. Because the Com-
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IV 
The Commission's suppression of bill inserts that discuss 
controversial issues of public policy directly infringes speech 
protected by the First Amendment. The state action is 
neither a valid time, place, or manner restriction, nor a per-
missible subject-matter regulation, nor a narrowly drawn pro-
hibition justified by a compelling state interest. Accordingly, 
the regulation is invalid. First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 795. 
The decision of the New York Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
mission has failed to demonstrate that such costs could not be allocated 
between shareholders and ratepayers, we have no occasion to decide 
whether the rule of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209 
( 1977), would prevent Consolidated Edison from passing on to ratepayers 
the costs of bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public policy. 
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The question in this case is whether the First Amendment 
is violated by an order of the Public Service Commission of 
the Sta.tc of New York that prohibits the inclusion in monthly 
electric bills of inserts discussing controversial issues of public 
policy. 
I 
The Consolidated Edison Company of New York, appel-
lant in this case, placed written material entitled "Independ-
ence Is Still a Goal, and Nuclear Power Is Needed To Win 
The Battle" in its January 1976 billing envelope. The bill 
insert stated Consolidated Edison's views on "the benefits of 
nuclear power," saying that they "far outweigh any potential 
risk" and that nuclear power plants are safe, economica.I, and 
clean. App., at 35. The utility also contended that increased 
use of nuclear energy would further this country's iudepend-
euce from foreign energy sources. 
In March 1976, the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. (NRDC) requested Consolidated Edison to enclose a 
rebuttal prepared by NRDC in its next billing envelope. /d., 
at 45-46. When Consolidated Edison refused, NRDC asked 
the Public Service Commission of the State of New York 
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to open Consolidated Edison's billing envelopes to contrasting 
views on controversial issues of public importance. Id., at 
32-33. 
On February 17, 1977, the Commission, appellee here, denied 
NRDC's request, but prohibited "utilities from using bill 
inserts to discuss political matters, including the desirability 
of future development of nuclear power." Id., at 50. The 
Commission explained its decision in a Statement of Policy on 
Advertising and Promotion Practices of Public Utilities issued 
on February 25, 1977. The Commission concluded that Con-
solidated Edison customers who receive bills containing inserts 
are a captive audience of diverse views who should not be 
subjected to the utility's beliefs. Accordingly, the Commis-
sion barred utility companies from including bill inserts that 
express "their opinions or viewpoints on controversial issues 
of public policy." Id., at 43a. The Commission did not, 
however, bar utilities from sending bill inserts discussing 
topics that are not "controversial issues of public policy." 
The Commission later denied petitions for rehearing filed by 
Consolidated Edison and other utilities. I d., at 59a. 
Consolidated Edison sought review of the Commission's 
order in the New York state courts. The State Supreme 
Court. Special Term, held that the order violated the First 
Amendment. 93 Misc. 2d 313, 402 N. Y. S. 2d 551 (1978). 
But the State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed, 63 
A. D. 2d 364, 407 N.Y. S. 2d 735 (1978), and the New York 
Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 47 N. Y. 2d 94, 
390 N. E. 2d 749 (1979). The Court of Appeals held that 
the order did not violate the First Amendment because it was 
a valid time, place, and manner regulation designed to protect 
the privacy of Consolidated Edison's customers. ld., at 106-
107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. We noted probable jurisdiction, 
-U.S. - (1979) . We reverse. 
II 
'rhe restrictio;1 0'11! bin inserts cannQt be upheld on the· 
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ground that Consolidated Edison is not entitled to the protec-
tions of the First Amendment. In First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), we rejected the con-
tention that a State could confine corporate speech to specified 
issues. That decision recognized that "[t]he inherent worth 
of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public 
does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether cor-
poration, association, union or individual." !d., at 777. Be-
cause the state action limited protected speech, we concluded 
that the regulation could not stand absent a showing of a 
compelling state interest. !d., at 786.1 
The First aud Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no 
State shall "abridg[e] the freedom of speech." See Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-501 (1952). Free-
dom of speech is "indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth," Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 
( 1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and "the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market .... " Abrams v. United States, 250 
U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) .2 The First 
Amendment removes "governmental restraints from the arena 
1 Nor doe:; Consolidated Edbon'::; :status as a privately owned but gov-
ernment. regulated monopoly preclude its a::;sertion of First Amendment 
rights . See Centml Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Com-
misl!ion, No. 79-565 :slip op., at 8-9 (1980). We have recognized that the 
speech of heavily regulated bu::;ine;;ses may t>njoy constitutional protection. 
See, e. g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Council, 425 U. S. 748, 763-765 (1976). 
Consolidated Edi::;on's position as a regulated monopoly doe:; not decrease 
the informative value of its opinions on critical public matt-ers. See 
grnerully Public Media Center v. FCC,- U.S. App. D. C.-, 587 F. 
2d 1322, 1325, 1326 (1978); Pacific Gas (~ Electric Co. v. City of Berkeley, 
60 Cal. App. 8d 123, 127-129 (1976). 
2 Freedom of Hpeech alHo protects the individual's interest in self-
expressiOn. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 777, 
n. 12 (1078); ::;ee T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6 
(1970). 
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of public discussion, putting the decision as to what · views 
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the 
hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more 
capable citizenry and more perfect polity .... " Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).8 
This Court has emphasized that the First Amendment 
"embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and 
truthfully all matters of public concern .... " Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940); see Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966). In the mailing that triggered the 
regulation at issue, Consolidated Edison advocated the use 
of nuclear power. The Commission has limited the means 
by which Consolidated Edison may participate in the public 
debate on this question and other controversial issues of 
national interest and importance. Thus, the Commission's 
prohibition of discussion of controversial issues strikes at the 
heart of the freedom to speak. 
III 
The Commissiou's ban on bill inserts is not, of course, 
invalid merely because it infringes protected speech. See 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 786. We 
must consider whether the State can demonstrate that its 
regulation is a permissible limitation on speech. The Com-
mission 's arguments require us to consider three theories that 
might justify the state action. We must determine whether 
the prohibition is (i) a reasonable time, place, or manner 
restriction , (ii) a permissible subject-matter regulation , or 
(iii) a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state 
interest. 
A 
This Court has recognized the validity of reasonable time, 
place, or manner regulations that serve a significant govern-
s Seo also A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 35-36 (1965). 
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mental interest and leave ample alternative channels for com-
munication. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 
U. S. 85, 93 (1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 771 
(1976). See also Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, at 104 (Black, J., 
dissenting). In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 563 (1941), 
this Court upheld a licensing requirement for parades through 
city streets. The Court recognized that the regulation, which 
was based on time, place, or manner criteria, served the munic-
ipality's legitimate interests in regulating traffic, securing pub-
lic order, and insuring that simultaneous parades did not pre-
vent all speakers from being heard. I d., at 576. Similarly, 
in Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972), we upheld an 
antinoise regulation prohibiting demonstrations that would 
disturb the good order of an educational facility. The nar-
rowly drawn restriction constitutionally advanced the city's 
interest "in having an undisrupted school session conducive 
to students' learning .... " !d., at 119. Thus, the essence 
of time, place, or manner regula.tion lies in the recognition 
that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, 
may frustrate legitimate governmental goals. No matter 
""hat its message. a roving soundtrack that blares at 2 a. m. 
disturbs neighborhood tranquility. 
A restriction that regulates only the time, place, or manner 
of speech may be imposed constitutionally so long as it is 
reasonable. But when regulation is based upon the content 
of speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more care-
fully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited 
"merely because public officials disapprove the spe'3ker's 
views." Nieuwtko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268. 282 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). See Erznoznik 
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 209 (1975); Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 99 (1972).4 
4 Sre al::;o Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 
1965 ~\IP · Ct. Rev. 29. 
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Therefore, a time, place, or manner restriction may not be 
based upon the content of speech. See Linmark Associates, 
Inc. v. Willingboro, supra, at 93-94; see also ?apish v. Uni-
versity of Missouri Curators, 410 U. S. 667, 670 (1973) (per 
curiam). 
The Commission does not pretend that its action is unre-
lated to the content of bill inserts. Indeed, it has under-
taken to suppress certain bill inserts precisely because they 
address controversial issues of public policy. The Commis-
sion allows inserts that present information to consumers on 
certain subjects, such as energy conservation measures, but it 
forbids the use of inserts that discuss public controversies. 
The Commission, with commendable candor, justifies its ban 
on the ground tha.t consumers will benefit from receiving "use-
ful" information, but not from the prohibited information. 
See App. to Juris. St., at 66a-67a. The Commission's own 
rationale demonstrates that its actiou cam10t be upheld as a 
content-ueutral time, place, or manner regulation. 
B 
The Commission next argues that its order is acceptable 
because it suppresses all discussion of nuclear power, whether 
pro or con, in bill inserts. The prohibition, the Commission 
contends, is related to subject-matter rather than to the views 
of a particular speaker. Because the regulation does not 
favor either side of a political controversy, the Commission 
asserts that it is coustitutio11ally permissible. 
Nevertheless, the First Amendment's hostility to ·content-
based regula.tion extends not only to restrictions on particular 
viewpoints, but also to supression of public discussion of an 
entire topic. In Police Department v. Mosley, supra, at 95, 
we said that "the First Amendment means that government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter or its content." See Cox v. Louisiana, 
supra, at 580-581 (Black, J., dissenting). We held that a 
:municipality ·cQu}d not exempt labor picketing from a general" 
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prohibition on picketing at a school even though the ban 
would have reached both pro- and anti-union demonstrations. 
If the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open, gov-
ernments must not be allowed to choose "which issues are 
worth discussing or debating .... " 408 U. S., at 96. See 
also Erznoznik v. City of Jack:sonville, supra, at 214-215 
(1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 
510-511 (1969). To allow a government the choice of 
permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that 
government control over the search for political truth. 
In limited circumstances, however, governmental regula-
tion may be based upon the subject-matter of speech.5 The 
court below relied upon two cases in which this Court has 
recognized tha.t the government may bar from its facilities 
certain speech that would disrupt the legitimate governmental 
purpose for which the property has been dedicated. 47 
N. Y. 2d. at 107, 390 N. E. 2d. at 755. In Greer v. Spock, 424 
U. S. 828 (1976), we held that the Federal Government could 
prohibit partisan political speech on a military base even 
though civilian speakers had been allowed to lecture on other 
subjects. See id., at 838, n. 10.6 In Lehmann v. Shaker 
5 For example, when courts are asked to determine whl:'ther a species 
of speech is covered by the First. Amendment., thl:'y must look to the 
content of the expression. See Central Hudson v. Public Service Com-
mission, No. 79-565, ~lip op., at 4 (1980) (commercial speech); Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 340 (1974) (libl:'l); Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U. S. 15 (1978) (ob~cenity); Chapz.insky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U. S . 568, 572-573 (1942) (fighting words). Compare Federal 
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 746-
747 (1978) (opinion of STEVENS, .J.), and Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (opinion of STEVENS, .J.), with Fed-
eml Communicatians Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, supra, at 761 
(OJlinion of PowELL, J.), id. , at 762-763 (BRENNAN, .J., dissenting), rmd 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, supra, at 87 (STEWART, J., dissenting) 
(indecent speech) . 
6 The necessity for excluding partisan speech was bnsed upon the tra-
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Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.), 
a plurality of the Cour.t similarly concluded that a city transit 
system that rented space in its vehicles for commercial adver~ 
tising did not have to accept partisan political advertising. 
The municipality's refusal to accept political advertising was 
based upon fears that partisan advertisements might jeopard-
ize long term commercial revenue, that commuters would be 
subjected to political propaganda, and that acceptance of 
particular political advertisements might lead to charges of 
favoritism. Id., at 302, 304.7 
Greer and Lehmann properly are viewed as narrow e>.':cep-
tions to the general prohibition against subject-matter dis-
tinctions. In both cases, the Court was asked to decide 
whether a public facility was open to all speakers.8 The 
plurality in Lehmann and the Court in Greer concluded that 
partisan political speech would disrupt the operation of gov-
ernmental facilities even though other forms of speech posed 
no such danger. 
The analysis of Greer and Lehmann is not applicable to the 
entanglrment, with partisan politi(•a.l campaigns of any kind." !d., at 839. 
Thul:l, the Court'l': deci~ion constmed the public right of ucce~s in light 
of "the unique character of the Government. property upon which the 
expression is to tnke place." !d., at 842 (Powr;LL, J., concurring). 
7 Mr .. Justice Douglus, who concurred in the judgment in Lehmann, did 
not view "tho content of thr me:<:;ngr as relevant either to the petitioner's 
right to cxprei'S it. or to the commuter><' right to be free from it." 418 
U. S., at 308. Rather, Justice Douglas upheld tho municipalit~r'~; actions 
because commuters were a captive audience. !d., at. 306-308. The Con-
solicLtted Edison cu::;tomer::; who receive bill insert~; are not a. capative 
audience. See infra, at 10-11. Four .Twstices di~sented in Lehmann 
on the ground that the municipality could not discriminate among 
advertisers. 418 U. S., at 308, 309 (BR~:NNAN, J., di;;scnting). 
8 Lehmann and Greer repre~cnt only one category of 1.his Court's cases 
dea.ling with rights of acce~s to governmental property. Compare 'l'inkei· 
v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S., at. 512-513, nnd Hayue v. Com-
mittee for Industrial Oryanization, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516 (opinion ·of 
Roberts, J .) , with Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) . 
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Commission's regulation of bill inserts. In both cases, a 
private party asserted a right of access to public facilities. 
Consolidated Edison has not asked to use the offices of the 
Commission as a forum from which to promulgate its views. 
Rather, it seeks merely to utilize its own billing envelopes to 
promulgate its views on controversial issues of public policy. 
The Commission asserts that the billing envelope, as a neces~ 
sary adjunct to the operations of a public utility, is subject 
to the State's plenary control. To be sure, the State has a 
legitimate regulatory interest in controlling Consolidated Edi-
son's activities, just as local governments always have been 
able to use their police powers iu the public iuterest to regu-
late private behavior. See New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U. S. 
297. 303 (1976) (per curiam). But the Commission's at-
tempt to restrict the free expression of a private party cannot 
be upheld by reliance upoll precedent that rests on the special 
interests of a govermneut iu overseeiug the use of its property. 
c 
'Where a government restricts the speech of a private 
person, the state action may be sustained only if the govern-
ment can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means 
of serving a compelling state interest. See First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 786; Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam). See also Bates v. Little 
Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960).9 The Commission argues 
0 The Commission con1end~ that. it11 order should be judged under the 
standard of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), becamm 
the orucr "is only secondarily concerned with the subject matter of 
Con~olidatecl Edison communications ... . " Brief for Appelll>e, at 9, 
n. 3. The O'Brien test npplies to rcgulntions that incidentally infringe 
speech where "1 he govcrnmentnl interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression .... " 391 U. S., at 377. The bill insert prohibition 
doc:; not further a gov{'rnmen1al interest unrelated to the suppression 
of i'ipeech. Indeed, the court below justified the ban expressly on the 
basis that the ::;peech might be harmful to con~umers. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 
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finally that its prohibition is necessary (i) to avoid forcing 
Consolidated Edison's views on a captive audience, (ii) to allo-
cate limited resources in the public interest, and (iii) to en-
sure that ratepayers do not subsidize the cost of the bill 
inserts. 
The State Court of Appeals largely based its approval of 
the prohibition upon its conclusion that the bill inserts in-
truded upon individual privacy.10 The court shted that 
the Commission could act to protect the privacy of the util-
ity's customers because they have no choice whether to receive 
the insert and the views expressed in the insert may inflame 
their sensibilities. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 106-107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 
755. But the Court of Appeals erred in its assessment of the 
seriousness of the intrusion. 
Even if a short exposure to Consolidated Edison's views 
may offend the sensibilities of some consumers, the ability of 
government "to shut off discourse solely to protect others from 
hearing it [is] dependent upon a showing that substantial 
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolera-
ble manner." Cohen v. California, 403 U. S., at 21. A less 
stringent analysis would permit a government to slight the 
First Amendment's role "in affording the public access to dis-
cussion, debate and the dissemination of information and 
ideas." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., 
at 783; see Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications 
10 The State Court of Appeals also referred to the alternative meuns by 
which Consoliduted Edi,;on might promulgnte its views on ccntroversial 
is~ues of public policy. Although a time, pluce, and manner re~triction 
cannot be upheld without examination of altcrnutive avenues of communi-
cation open to potential ~peukers, see Linmark Associates v. Willingboro, 
supra. at 93, we have consistently rejected the suggestion that a govern-
ment mny justify a content-bused prohibition by ~hawing that speakers 
have alternative means of expression. See Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Council , Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 757, n. 15 (1976); 
So·utheastem Promotions Ltd. v. Conmd, 420 U. S. 546, 556 (1975); 
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411, n, 4 (1974) (pe1· cu1·iam), 
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·Commission, 395 U.S. 367. 390 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, 381 U.S .. 301, 308 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). 
"\Vhere a single speaker communicates to many listeners, 
the First Amendment does not permit the government to 
prohibit speech as intrusive unless the "captive" audience can-
not avoid objectionable speech. 
PaEsengers on public transportation, see Lehmann v. Shaker 
Heights, 418 U. S., at 307-308 (Douglas, J., concurring in 
the judgment), or residents of a neighborhood disturbed by 
the raucous broadcasts from a passing soundtruck, cf. Kovacs 
v. Cooper, supra, may well be unable to escape an unwanted 
message. But customers who encounter an objectionable 
billing insert may "effectively avoid further bombardment of 
their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Cohen v. 
California, supra, at 21. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405, 412 (1974) (per curiam). The customer of Consolidated 
Edison may escape exposure to objectionable material simply 
by transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket.11 
The Commission contends that because a billing envelope 
can accommodate only a limited amount of information, poli-
tical messages should not be allowed to take the place of in-
serts that promote energy conservation or safety, or that 
remind consumers of their legal rights. The Commission 
relies upon Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 395 U. S. 367 (1969), in which the Court held 
11 Although this Court hw; recognized the special privacy interests that 
attach to per~ons who seek ~erlu~i0n within their own homes, ~;ee Rowan 
v. Post Office Department, 397 U. S. 728, 737 (1970), the arrival of a 
billing envelope is hardly as intrusive as the visit of a door-to-door so-
licitor. Yet the Court has rejected the contention that a municipality 
may ban door-to-door r:;olicitor;; becau~e they may invade the privac~r of 
household:;. Martin v. Str'Uthers. 319 U. S. 141, 146-147 (1943). Even 
if there were a compelling state interest in protecting consumers ag11inst 
overly intrusive bill inserts, it i~; prs::ible that the State could ach!eve its 
goal simply by requ;ring Consolidat·ed Edison to stop :;ending bill inserts 
to the homes of objecting customers. See Rawan v. Post Office De-
part?nent, supra. 
79-134-0PINION 
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that the regulation of radio and television broadcast fre-
quencies permit the Federal Government to exercise unusual 
authority over speech. But billing envelopes differ from 
broadcast frequencies in two ways. .First, a broadcaster com-
municates through use of a scarce, publicly owned resource. 
No person can broadca.st without a license, whereas all persons 
are free to send correspoudence to private homes through the 
mails. Thus, it cannot be said that billing envelopes are a 
limited resource comparable to the broadcast spectrum. Sec-
ond, the Commission has not shown on the record before us 
that the presence of the bill inserts at issue would preclude 
the inclusion of other inserts that Consolidated Edison might 
be ordered lawfully to include in the billing envelope. Unlike 
radio or television stations broadcasting on a single frequency, 
multiple bill inserts will not result in a "cacophony of com-
peting voices." I d., at 376. 
Finally, the Commission urges that its prohibition would 
prevent ratepayers from subsidizing the costs of policy-
oriented bill inserts. But the Commission did not base 
its order on an inability to allocate costs between the share-
h0lders of Consolidated Edison and the ratepayers. Rather, 
the Commission stated "that using bill inserts to proclaim a 
utility's viewpoint on controversial issues (even when the 
stockholder pays for it in full) is tantamount to taking ad-
vantage of a captive audience .... " App. to Juris. St., at 
43a (emphasis added). Accordingly, there is no basis on this 
record to assume that the Commission could not exclude the 
cost of these bill inserts from the utility's rate base.12 Mere 
speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling state 
interest. See Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 389 
U.S. 217, 222-223 (1967).13 
12 In it~:; denial of petitions for rehearing, the Commission re-emphasized 
that it would impose the ban without regard to nllocation of costs between 
shareholders and ratepayers. App., at 67a, n . 1. 
13 The Commi~sion also contends that ratepayers cannot be forced to-
support the costs of Consolidated Edison'i:i bill .inserts. Because the Com-
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IV 
The Comltlission's suppression of bill inserts that discuss 
controversial issues of public policy directly infringes speech 
protected by the First Amendment. The state action is 
neither a valid time, place, or matlller restriction, nor a per-
missible subject-matter regulation, uor a narrowly drawn J>ro-
hibition justified by a compt'lling state interest. Accordi11gly, 
the regulatiou is invalid. First National Bank uj Boston v. 
Bellotti, 4:35 U. S., at 795. 
The decision of the ~ew York Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
, 
mi~:::ion hm; failed to demou:;tratc that :;uch co~;t~ could not be ullocnted 
bctwet>n shareholder:; and ratepa~·cr:;, we have no occasion to uecide 
whether the rule of Abood "· Detroit Board of Education, 4:31 U. S. 209 
(HJ77), would prevent Con:-olidated Edif:on from pa:;sing on to ratepayers 
the costt:J of IJUl in~erts that di;;eu:;:; controver::;ial i::;:;ue:; of public policy, 
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Dear Lewis: 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 16, J 980 
Re: 79-134 - Consolidated Edison v. Public Service 
Commission 
Dear Lewis: 
If you can make two changes in your draft opinion, 
I would be happy to join it. 
First, it seems to me that as now written there is 
some tension between the second and third sentences of 
the paragraph that begins at the bottom of page 5 and 
runs over to the top of page 6. The problem would be 
solved if you could revise the sentence at the top of 
page 6 to read substantially as follows: 
~~d>d~ 
"Therefore, although there areA situ~tions in 
which a time, place, or manner restriction may 
be based on the subject matter of certain 
types of communication, see Lehmann v. Shaker 
Heights, 418 u.s. 298; Greer v. Speck, 424---
u.s. 828; Young v. American Mlni Theatres, 427 
u.s. 50, no such restriction may be basea-on 
the particular point of viewexpressed by the 
speaker. See Linmark Associates etc." 
Second, because the sentence you quote from Mosley 
toward the bottom of page 6 ("[T]he First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter or its content") is inconsistent with the 
holdings in Lehmann, Greer, Young, and Pacifica,_ it 
seems to me that that sentence should not be quoted with 
unqualified approval in this opinion. I would propose 
that you simply eliminate that sentence and cite cox 
right after the preceeding sentence and then mererv-say 
that "In !Osley we held that a municipality •... " 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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Personal 
May 21, 1980 
Re: 79-134 - Consolidated Edison v. Public 
Service Commission 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your thoughtful response to my 
letter. I am afraid that the conceptual difference 
that separated us in Mini Theatres and Pacifica con-
tinues to be a problem. 
I frankly do not understand how the Court can 
continue to state, as you do in your draft as well 
as in your letter, that "a time,, place or manner 
restriction may not be based upon the content of 
speech" and yet not disavow the holdings in a whole .} 
series of cases in which the Court has done precisely 
that. } 
.. 
I appreciate your attempt to satisfy my concerns, 
but I am afraid it will be necessary for me to write 
separately. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
JS 5/21/80 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 79-134, Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission 
Attached is a proposed letter to Justice Stevens. As 
- ,. 
you requested, it contains a possible addition that may explain 
your opinion more clearly. 
To be frank, however, I do not believe that Justice 
Strevens' views derives from his inability to understand our 
opinion. I think that the language on pp 5-6 quite clearly 
states why a time, place, and manner restriction must be 
content-neutral. Indeed, the proposed addition is somewhat 
repetitive. For that reason, I would not suqqest adding the 
insert unless that action will convince Justice Stevens to ioin 
2. 
the opinion. We have a Court and the addition says little that 
is not already clear from the opinion. I've asked David whether 
he believes that the insert adds anything significant to the 
opinion, and he says he doesn't think it is needed. 
Justice Stevens cites three cases in support of his 
statement that time, place, and manner restrictions may be basen 
upon the subject matter of certain types of communication. In 
two of the cases, Lehman and Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 
there was no Court opinion. But I do not believe that even the 
plurality opinions support Justice Stevens' assertion. In 
.......... -
Lehman, the plurality ~basea-its analysis on the right 
of the government to dec ide what advertising to accept in its 
buses. The plurality held that the car cards were not a public 
forum. Discussion of time, place, and manner analysis is 
intertwined with public forum analysis. Similarly in Young, the 
plurality emphasizes that the indecent nature of the speech . " 
allows content-based distinctions. Although there is some 
mention that the restrict ion merely regulates "place," that is 
only the faintest invocation of time, place, and manner 
analysis. Greer is the only Court opinion cited by Justice 
Stevens. Again "place" is important, but only because the site 
of speech was to be a military base. The Court explicitly 
discussed "public forum" analysis, but not the time, place, and 
manner standard. Public forum analysis will always bear a 
superficial resemblance to time, place, and manner analysis. 
-'· 
Thus, I believe we have correctly analyzed these three 
cases. In Young the Court looked to content to dec ide whether 
the First Amendment protects indecent speech. The quest ion in 
Lehman and Greer was whether a piece of public property was a 
public forum. 
Stevens' 
I do not believe it is 
reliance upon these cases 
worth challenging Justice 
in the letter to him. It 
seems more positive to explain why our cases do support what you 
say. Nevertheless, I believe that a careful examination of the 
cases would lead Justice Stevens to agree with us. 
• ' 
:' ':fu:. .. 
!~;;:.. ·~· J.' ~· 
79-134 Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission 
• J 
PERSONAL 
Dear John: ~·. ~j--
Thank you for the opportunity to answer your 
concerns about my draft opinion. 
I do not think there is tension between the second 
and third sentences of the paragraph running from paqe five 
to page six. The Niemotko quotation refers to a speaker's 
view. The quotation Is followed by a citation to Erznozik v. 
Citl of Jacksonville, which states that •raJ State or 
ciPality may protect individual privacy by enacting 
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations applicable to 
all speech irrespective of content." 422 u.s., at 209. Then 
my opinion cites Mosley, which states that: 
'f' .:·· "In this case, the ordinance itself describes 
impermissible picketing not in terms of time, place, 
and manner, but in terms of subject matter. The 
regulation "thus slip[s] from the neutrality of 
time, place, and circumstance into a concern about 
content.• (quoting Kalven, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 29] 
This is never permitted. 
I view these cases as establishing that "a time, place or 
manner restriction may not be based upon the content of 
speech." Ante, at 6. If the opinion is not sufficiently 
clear, however, I would be happy to add one or both of the 
above quotations either in the text or a footnote. 
You do not suggest that the last paragraph of IIIA 
be altered. That paragraph states that the bill insert 
regulation is not content neutral, and the Commission's 
action cannot, therefore, be upheld as a time, place, or 
manner regulation. It seems to me that the languaqe you 
suggest could be viewed as creating a conflict between the 
last two paragraphs of IliA. After establishing that a time, 
place, and manner regulation could be based on subject 
matter, we would state that the subject matter restriction in 
this case cannot be sustained as a time, place, or manner 






Perhaps I can make another modification that might 
accomodate your concerns. In foonote nine, t.he opinion 
explains why the restriction in this case cannot be judged 
under Unit.ed States v. O'Brien. I could move thi.e: footnote to 
the last sentence of-riiA on page six. I am considerinq 
adding an additional paragraph to that footnote to state 
substantially as follows: 
"Of course, the restriction is not invalid merely 
because it fails to qualify either as a time, place, 
and manner regulation or because it does not pass · 
the standard of United States v. O'Brien. Where 
the state goal is unrelated to~he content or 
subiect-matter of speech, we can be more certain 
that the state is not attempting to censor political 
views. Thus, both the time, place, and manner and 
the United States v. O'Brien tests, which have 
evolve~ as methods~o Identify situations i.n which 
non-speech related qoals are advanced through means 
that infringe tangentially upon speech, are 
applicable only to content-neutral regulation. State 
action like the regulation at issue in this case 
that is based explicitly on either subject-matter or 
a speaker's point of view must be judqed under the 
More searchinq analysis discussed in Parts IIIB and 
IIIC infra." 
As to your second point, I understand that the 
Mosley quotation on page six may be confusinq at first 
qlance. I believe, however, that the structure of the 
discussion on paqes six through nine clearly explains that 
Mosley states a qeneral principle to which there are two 
narrow exceptions. Still, I would be willing to modify the 
second paraaraph of IIIB to elimjn~te any possible confusion. 
Perhaps we could state that: "The general principle, subject 
only to limited exceptions, is well stated in Police 
Department v. Mosley, supra, at 95. We said that 1 the First 
Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its messaae, its ideas, its subject 
matter or its content.•• 
Sincerely, ':." 
~--; 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 79-134, Consolidated Edison v. PSC 
You may be interested in knowing that Justice Stevens 
has taken a position in Carey :!.!.. Brown, No. 79-703 that is at 
odds with his private stance in the Con Ed case. ; " 
After Carey was circula.ted yesterday, Justice Stevens 
told Justice Brennan that he would join the opinion if Justice 
Brennan would delete a sentence from Mosely on page 7 of the 
draft. That sentence was the same sentence Justice Stevens 
objected to in Con Ed: "the First Amendment means that the 
government has no power to restrict express ion because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content ••• " 
Justice Brennan agreed to the change, and Justice Stevens 
promptly joined Carey. The remainder of the draft emphasizes, in 




restriction) must be justified as a necessary means to the 
achievement of a compelling state interest. 
Suprisingly, Justice Stevens did not object to language 
on page 14 where Justice Brennan quotes the admonition from 
Erznoznik that a "state or municipality may protect indiviual 
privacy by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner 
regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content." 
By joining Carey Justice Stevens has contradicted his own view 
that time, place, and manner restrictions may be based upon the 
content of speech. 
Perhaps this means that Justice Stevens will not object 
to the same analysis in Con Ed. It would seem odd for a Justice 
---"" -
to adopt inconsistent views in two opinions issued almost 
simultaneously. 
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No. 79-134 - Consolidated Edison Company of New York Jl ' . ~ 
v. Public Service Commission of New York ~~
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. 
My dissent in this case in no way indicates any 
disapprobation on my part of the precious rights~e~~ 
(so carefully catalogued by the Court in its 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments against 
repression by the State. My prior writings for the Court in 
the speech area prove conclusively my sensitivity about the se 
rights and my concern for them. See, ~' Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. 
' 
' 
Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bates v. State 
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
- 2 -
But I cannot agree with the Court that the New York Public 
Service Commission's ban on the utility bill insert somehow 
deprives the utility of its First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. Because of Consolidated Edison's monopoly status and 
its rate structure, the use of the insert amounts to an 
exaction from the utility's customers by way of forced aid for 
7 
the utility's speech. And, contrary to the Court's suggestion, --
an allocation of the insert's cost between the utility's 
shareholders and the ratepayers would not eliminate this 
coerced subsidy. 
I 
A public utility is a state-created monopoly. See, ~, 
N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 68 (McKinney 1955); Jones, Origins of 
the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity; 
Developments in the States 1870-1920, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 426, 
458-461 (1979); Comment, Utility Rates, Consumers, and the Ne\'l 
York State Public Service Commission, 39 Albany L. Rev. 707, 
No. 79-134 
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709-714 (1975). Although monopolies generally are against the 
public policies of the United States and of the State of New 
York, see, ~, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340 (McKinney 1968), 
Consolidated Edison and other utilities are permitted to 
operate as monopolies because of a determination by the State 
that the public interest is better served by protecting them 
from competition. See 2 A. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation 
113-171 (1971). 
This exceptional grant of power to private enterprises 
justifies extensive oversight on the part of the State to 
protect the ratepayers from exploitation of the monopoly power 
through excessive rates and other forms of overreaching. For 
this reason, the State regulates the rates that utilities may 
charge. See N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 66.12 (McKinney 1979-1980 
Supp.) . In addition, New York law gives its Public Service 
Commission plenary supervisory po~1ers over all property, real 
and personal, "used or to be used for or in connection with or 
No. 79-134 
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to facilitate the • • sale or furnishing of electricity for 
light, heat or power." N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law§§ 2.12 and 66.1 
(McKinney 1955). State law explicitly gives the Commission 
control over the format of the utility bill and any material 
included in the envelope with the bill. § 66.12-a (McKinney 
1979-1980 Supp.). 
The rates authorized by the Public Service Commission may 
reflect only the costs of providing necessary services to 
customers plus a reasonable rate of return to the utility's 
shareholders. See, ~' Comment, 39 Albany L. Rev., at 
719-723. The entire bill payment system meters, 
meter-reading, bill mailings, and bill inserts -- are paid for 
by the customers under Commission rules permitting recovery of 
necessary operating expenses. Uniform System of Accounts 
Expense Accounts Customer Account Expenses, 16 N.Y. Code 
Rules & Regs. Vol. A §§ 901-906. Under the laws of New York 
and other States, however, a public utility cannot include in 
No. 79-134 
the rate base the costs o advertisin and lobbying. 
/ 





------- __ .. ---·--
Expenditures for Certain Civic, Political and Related 
Activities, 16 N.Y. Code Rules & Regs. ch. II, subch. F; 
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Cornrn'n, 
239 La. 175, 207-209, 118 So.2d 372, 384 (1960); Southwestern 
Bell Tel. Co., 19 P.U.R. 4th 1, 28-29 (Kan. Corp. Comrn'n 
1977); Boushey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co, 10 P.U.R. 4th 23 
(Cal. Pub. Util. Cornrn'n 1975) (banning controversial bill 
inserts); Cascade Natural Gas Corp., 8 P.U.R. 4th 19, 27 (Ore. 
Pub. Util. Comrn'n 1974); Pacific Power & Light Co., 34 P.U.R. 
3d 36, 46-47 (Ore. Pub. Util. Cornrn'n 1960); Southwestern Bell 
Tel. Co., 77 P.U.R. (n.s.) 33, 42 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Cornm'n 
1949); In re Investigation into the Advertising and 
Promotional Practicies of Regulated Iowa Pub. Utils, No. U-463 
(Iowa State Commerce Cornm'n Jan. 29, 1975). These costs cannot 
be passed on to consumers because ratepayers derive no 
No. 79-134 
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service-related benefits from 
purpose of such advertising and lobbying is to benefit the 
utility's shareholders, and its cost must be deducted from 
profits otherwise available for the shareholders. The Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, formerly the Federal Power 
Commission, has adopted this rule as well. Alabama Power Co., 
24 F.P.C. 278, 286-287 (1960), aff'd sub. nom. Southwestern 
Electric Power Co. v. Federal Power Com' n, 30 4 F. 2d 29 (CAS) 
cert. denied, 371 u.s., 924 (1962); Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, Uniform System of Accounts, Account 426.4, 18 CFR 
Part 101, p. 383 (1979). 
II 
The Commission concluded, properly in my view, that use of 
the billing envelope to distribute management's pamphlets 
amounts to a forced subsidy of the utility's speech by the 
----.__ 
ratepayers. Consolidated Edison would counter this argument by 
pointing out that it is willing to allocate to shareholders the 
No. 79-134 
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additional costs attributable to the inserts. It maintains: 
"The fact that the utilities may incidentally save money by the 
use of bill inserts, at no expense to the ratepayers, is not 
detrimental to the ratepayers or the public." Brief for 
Appellant 21. 
I do not accept appellant's argument that preventing a 
"free ride" for the utility's message, is not a substantial, 
legitimate state concern. Even though the free ride may cost 
the ratepayers nothing additional by way of specific dollars, 
it still qualifies as forced support of the utility's speech. --
See, ~' Boushe y v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 10 P.U.R. 4th, 
at 27; Note, Utility Compa nies and the First Amendment: 
Regulating the Use of Political Inserts in Utility Bills, 64 
Va . L. Rev . 9 21 , 9 2 6 ( 19 7 8) . If the State compelled an 
individual to help defray the utility's speech expenses, that 
compulsion surely would violate that person's First and 




Education, 431 U.S. 209, 233-235 (1977); id., at 256 
J., concurring). The fact that providing such aid c the 
individual nothing extr~ does not make the compulsion any less 
offensive. See ~oley v.--~~~0 u.s. 705, 714-715 
,, ~ 
(1977); Buckley v. varecr;--42-.t--·u:-s. 1, 22-23, 36 (recognizing 
that permitting a candidate to use real or personal property 
provides material financial assistance to the candidate), 91 n. 
124 (1976) .!/ For example, a state law requiring a person to 
permit the utility to include its insert in the envelope 
that per son's private letters clearly would infringe 
letter-writer's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
Of course, a private business does not deprive an 
individual of his constitutional rights unless state action is 
involved. Although the State has given utilities their 
monopoly power ana thus contributed to a situation in which 
coerced support of the utility's speech is possible, the state 








in this situation. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 
u.s. 345 (1974). 
I do not find it necessary, however, to decide whether ...., () 
~ 
state action in the Fourteenth Amendment sense has occurred 
~ 
here. It is not necessary to decide whether the ratepaye~
infringed i~~' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been 
order to determine whether the State has the power to prevent 
the utility from exacting aid from the ratepayers :; n 
dissemination of a message with which they do not all agree. 
Even if the State is not so entwined in the activities of 
Consolidated Edison to meet the state action requirement, the 
State has made a monopoly possible by preventing others from 
competing with the utility. Thus the State is legitimately 
concerned with preventing the utility from taking advantage of 
this monopoly power to 0 subsidize 
dissemination of its viewpoi t on political 
No. 79-134 
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In suggesting that the State's interest in eliminating 
forced subsidization of the utility's speech can be achieved by 
allocating the expenses of the inserts to the utility's 
shareholders, the Court has glosseo over the difficult 
allocation issue underlying this controversy. It is not clear 
to me from the Court's opinion whether it believes that 
charging the shareholders v1ith the marginal costs associated 
with the inserts, that is, the costs of printing and putting 
them into the envelope, will satisfy the State's interest, or 
whether the Court is suggesting some division of the fixed 
costs of the mailing, that is, the postage, the envelope, the 
creation and maintenance of the mailing list, and any other 
overhead expense. See ante, at (slip op., at 12). 
The Commission maintains that no allocation short of 
charging all the fixed costs of mailing the bills to the 
utility's shareholders will eliminate the problem of forced 
subsidization of the utility's speech. The Commission is 
No. 79-134 
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obviously correct that the utility will obtain a partial free 
ride for its message even if the shareholders are charged with 
part of the mailing costs in addition to the costs directly 
attributable to the inserts. Consumers would still be forced 
to aid in the dissemination of the utility's message by making 
the utility's distribution costs less than they otherwise would 
be. 
Charging all the mailing costs to the shareholders is -
equivalent, as a practical matter, to the Commission's ban on 
___. 
political inserts. ------- The utility wants to use the inserts only 
because they are less expensive than a separate mailing. ll 
Thus, there is no way for the State to achieve its important 
goal -- protecting the ratepayers from forced support of ideas 
with which they disagree 
. .........___. 
total ban. ________.. 
that is less restrictive than a 
~---------------------------
Because ratepayers bear the cost of this medium of 
communication, the utility's claim to use the bill envelope for 
- " . 
No. 79-134 
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its own purposes is not analogous to that of a private letter-
writer, or of a non-monopolistic business , whose customers can 
turn elsewhere if they object to inser ts in their bills that 
their sales dollars help to finance. Cf. First National Bank 
of Boston v • Be 11 ott i , 4 3 5 U • S . 7 6 5 , 7 9 4 n . 3 4 ( 19 7 8 ) • This, 
therefore , is not a typical prohibition of a speaker's attempt 
"me rely to utilize its own [property] to promulgate its 
views." Ante , at (slip op., at 9). Rather , this is an 
attempt by the utility to appropriate and make convenient use 
of property , for which the public is compe lled to pay, for the 
utility's sole benefit. The Co:rrunission ' s ban on bill inserts 
does not restrict the utility from using the shareholders' 
resources to fin ance communication of its viewpoints on any 
topi c . Consolidated Edison is completely fr ee to use the mails 
and any other medium of communication on the same basis as any 
other speaker . ,.....--..----- The order merely prevents the utility from 
subsidy from the ratepayers. This lead . me 
No. 79-134 
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to conclude that the State's attempt here to protect the 
ratepayers from unwillingly fin ancing the utility's speech and 
to preserve the billing e nvelope fo r the sole benefit of the 
cu stomers who p ay fo r it does not infringe upon the First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of the utility. 
III 
I might observe , additionally, th at I am hopeful that the 
Cou rt 's decision in thi s case has not completely ti ed a State's 
I( '-J'- I 
h ands in preventing thi s type o f abuse of monopoly p ower . The 
-
_____________ ,, ______________ _ 
Cou rt 's opinion appears to tu rn on the particular facts of thi s 
c ase , and slight differences in approach might p ermit a State 
to achieve its proper goals. 
First, it appears that New York and o ther States might u se 
their power to def ine property rights so that the billing 
envelope 
utility' s shareholders . 
---- "-~
Robins, ___ u.s. __ _ 
o f the not of the 
Cf. Pru neyard Shopping Center v. 
(198 0 ). Since it i s the r atepayers who 
No. 79-134 
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pay for the billing packet, I doubt that the Court would find a 
law establishing their ownership of the packet violative of 
either the Takings Clause or the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. If, under state law, the envelope belongs to the 
customers, I do not see how restricting the utility from using 
it could possibly be held to deprive the utility of its rights. 
Second, the opinion leaves open the issue of cost 
allocation. The Commission could charge the utility's 
shareholders all the costs of the envelopes and postage and of 
creating and maintaining the mailing list, and charge the 
consumers only the cost of printing and inserting the bill and 
the consumer service insert. See Long_J:sland Lighting Co. v. 
New York State Public Service Comm'n, reproduced in App. to 
Brief for Long Island Lighting Company as Amicus Curiae 22a. 
There is no reason that the shareholders should be given a free 
ride for their pamphlets, rather than the customers be given a 
free ride for their bills. Such an allocation would eliminate 
No. 79-134 
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the most offensive aspects of the forced subsidization of the 
utility's speech. But see n. 3, supra. 
Because I agree with the Appellate Division of the New York 
Supreme Court, that "[i]n the battle of ideas, the utilities 
are not entitled to require the consumers to help defray their 
expenses," 63 App. Div. 2d 364, 368, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 735, 737 
(1978), I respectfully dissent. 
No. 79-134 
!/ Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, u.s. --- ---
(1980), does not impinge upon this general principle. The 
decision there was based on the fact that the shopping center 
voluntarily chose to open its grounds to the public and 
therefore the State could require that the center permit the 
exercise of speech rights on the property . 
No. 79-134 
!:../ An example makes this point clear. States au thor i ze 
the creation of trusts, and the costs of administering a trust 
are charged to the trust estate. If the trustee, for example a 
bank, finds it necessary to communicate with the beneficiaries 
of the trust by letter concerning investments, income 
distribution and the like, the expenses of that mailing 
ordinarily are proper administrative costs to be borne by the 
trust. In the trust situation, it would seem to be entirely 
permissible for the State to prohibit the trustee from 
including in such a mailing its own political insert on a 
matter unrelated to the trust. Even though adding the bank's 
insert may cost the beneficiaries nothing, assuming that the 
bank pays for the printing and stuffing of the insert, the 
State has an interest in assuring that the trustee does not 
derive personal benefit from its role as trustee. The trustee 
has no constitutional right to a free ride for its message· 
No. 79-134 
(footnote 2 cont'd) 
Here, the state interest in preventing a utility from obtaining 
a free ride is even stronger, since utility customers have no 
choice but to purchase electricity from Consolidated Edison, 
while trusts are voluntarily created and the trustee is chosen 
by the trustor. 
No. 79-134 
ll Due to the greater likelihood that a recipient would 
read an insert with the bill, the utility well might desire to 
place its insert with the bill even if the total cost of the 
mailing were charged to the shareholders. See Long Island 
Lighting Co. v. New York State Public Service Cornm'n, No. 77 C 
972, (EDNY, March 30, 1977), reproduced in App. to Brief for 
Long Island Lighting Company as Amicus Curiae la. This, 
however, is just another type of forced aid for the utility's 
message that cannot be eliminated except by a total ban on bill 
inserts. 
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in this case. 
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Consolidated Edison Company 
of New York, Inc., 
Appellant, 
v. 
Public Service Commission of 
New York. 
On Appeal from the Court of 
Appeals of New York. 
[May -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether the First Amendment, ' 
as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is violated 
by an order of the Public Service Commission of the State 
of New York that prohibits the inclusion in monthly electric 
bills of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy. 
I 
The Consolidated Edison Company of New York, appel-
lant in this case, placed written material entitled "Independ-
ence Is Still a Goal, and Nuclear Power Is Needed To Win 
The Battle" in its January 1976 billing envelope. The bill 
insert stated Consolidated Edison's views on "the benefits of 
nuclear power," saying that they "far outweigh any potential 
risk" and tha.t nuclear power plants are safe, economical, and 
clean. App., at 35. The utility also contended that increased 
use of nuclea.r energy would further this country's independ-
ence from foreign energy sources. 
In March 1976, the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. (NRDC) requested Consolidated Edison to enclose a 
rebuttal prepared by NRDC in its next billing envelope. /d., 
at 45-46. When Consolidated Edison refused, NRDC asked 




2 CONSOLIDATED EDISON v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM'N 
to open Consolidated Edison's billing envelopes to contrasting 
views on controversial issues of public importance. I d., at 
32-33. 
On February 17, 1977, the Commission, appellee here, denied 
NRDC's request, but prohibited "utilities from using ·bill 
inserts to discuss political matters, including the desirability 
of future development of nuclear power." I d., at 50. · The 
Commission explained its decision in a Statement of Policy on 
Advertising and Promotion Practices of Public Utilities issued 
on February 25, 1977. The Commission concluded that Con-
solidated Edison customers who receive bills containing inserts 
are a captive audience of diverse views who should not be 
subjected to the utility's beliefs. Accordingly, the Commis-
sion barred utility companies from including bill inserts that 
express "their opinions or viewpoints on controversial issues 
of public policy." I d., at 43a. The Commission did not, 
however, bar utilities from sending bill inserts discussing 
topics that are not "controversial issues of public policy." 
The Commission later denied petitions for rehearing filed by 
Consolidated Edison and other utilities. Id., at 59a. 
Consolidated Edison sought review of the Commission's 
order in the New York state courts. The State Supreme 
Court, Special Term, held the order unconstitutional. 93 \ 
Misc. 2d 313, 402 N. Y. S. 2d 551 ( 1978). But the State 
Supre1ue Court, Appellate Division, reversed, 63 A. D. 2d 
364. 407 N. Y. S. 2d 735 (1978), and the New York Court 
of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 47 N. Y. 2d 94, 390 
N. E. 2c1 749 (1979). The Court of Appeals held that 
the order d1d not violate the Constitution because it was I 
a valid time, place, and manner regulation designed to protect 
the privacy of Consolidated Edison's customers. Id., at 106-
107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. We noted probable jurisdiction, 
-U.S.- (1979). We reverse. 
II 
The restriction on bill inserts cannot be upheld on th~ 
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ground that Consolidated Edison is not entitled to freedom f 
of speech. Iu First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,\ 
435 U. S. 765 (1978), we rejected the contention that a State 
Ql!J ~ confine corporate speech to specified issues. That 
decision recognized that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech 
in terms of its capa.city for informing the public does not 
depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, 
association, union or individual." !d., at 777. Because the 
state action limited protected speech, we concluded tha.t the 
regulation could not stand absent a showing of a compelling 
state interest. !d. , at 786.' 
The First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no 
State shall "abridg[e] the freedom of speech." See Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-501 (1952). Free-
dom of speech is "indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth," Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and "the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market ... • ·" Abrams v. United States, 250 
U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).2 The First 
and Fourteenth Amendments remove "governmental restraints 
1 Nor does Consolidated Edison's status as a privately owned but gov-
ernment regulated monopoly preclude its assertion of First Amendment 
rights. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, No. 79-565 slip op ., at 8-9 (1980) . We have recognized that the 
speech of heavily regulated bu~ine~t;es may enjoy cono;titutional protection. 
See, e. (! .. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) ; Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Council, 425 U. S. 748, 763-765 (1976). 
Consolidated Edison's position as a regulated monopoly does not decrease 
the informative value of its opinions on critical public matters. See 
generally Public Media Center v. FCC,- U.S. App. D. C.-, 587 F . 
2d 1322, 1325, 1326 (1978) ; Pacific Gas & Elect1ic Co. v. City of Berkeley, 
60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 127- 129 (1976) . 
2 Freedom of speech also protects the individual's interest in self-
expression. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 777, 
n. 12 (1978) ; see T . Emerson, The Syst.em of Freedom of Expression 6 
(1970). / 
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from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision a:s 
to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each 
of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately 
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity .... " 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24 (1971).3 
This Court has emphasized that the First Amendment 
"embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and 
truthfully all matters of public concern .... " Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940); see Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966). In the mailing that triggered the 
regulation at issue, Consolidated Edison advocated the use 
of nuclear power. The Commission has limited the means 
by which Consolidated Edison may participate in the public 
debate on this question and other controversial issues of 
national interest and importance. Thus, the Commission's 
prohibition of discussion of controversial issues strikes at the 
heart of the freedom to speak . 
. III 
The Commission's ban on bill inserts is not, of course, 
invalid merely because it imposes a limitation upon speech. \ 
8ee First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 786. 
We must consider whether the Sta.te can demonstrate that its 
regulation is constitutionally permissible. The Commission's I 
arguments require us to consider three theories that might 
justify the state action. We must determine whether the 
prohibition is (i) a reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tion , (ii) a permissible subject-rna tter regulation, or (iii) a 
narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state interest. 
A 
This Court has recognized the validity of reasonable time, ~ 
place, or manner regulations that serve a significant govern/" 
8 Se al8o A Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 35-36 (196.5). 
' . 
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mental interest and leave ample alternative channels for com-
munication. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 
U. S. 85, 93 (1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 771 
(1976). See also Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, at 104 (Black, J ., 
dissenting). In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 563 (1941), 
this Court upheld a licensing requirement for parades through 
city streets. The Court recognized that the regulation, which 
was based on time, place, or manner criteria, served the munic-
ipality's legitimate interests in regulating traffic, securing pub-
lic order, and insuring that simultaneous parades did not pre-
vent all speakers from being heard. !d., at 576. Similarly, 
in Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972) , we upheld an 
antinoise regulation prohibiting demonstrations that would 
disturb the good order of an educational facility. The nar-
rowly drawn restriction constitutionally advanced the city's 
interest "in having an undisrupted school session conducive 
to students' learning . . . . " !d., at 119. Thus, the essence 
of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recognition 
that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, 
may frustrate legitimate governmental goals. No matter 
what its message, a roving soundtrack that blares at 2 a. m. 
disturbs neighborhood tranquility. 
- };;: restriction that regulates ottly the time, plaee, ot ma:nBCP 
of 15l'eeeh may be imposed constitutionally reo long as it ii-
reasonable. But when regulation is bMed ttpon the eonteHi 
- of speech, governmental aetion mttst be ser-t:tt,in ized more eare 
1'tllly to ensure that connnunicatiun has not been prohibit~d 
- "merely beca.use publie officials disapprove the speaket!.s-
~iews " NitmwtkB v. Mfi;'1Jland, 340 U. S. 268, 282 (1951) ' 
!5? i · =:::? ! :.~!5£;~~ f~~ ~S!Af O..e 3 t ~f ~~ :/ ~e ,4 .:. !)~=i 
_9 4 ~ee 8 1M K!th efl, Tlla Concept of tba PuQli~: li\m~lfl . Cox ~ . LoaiJiO:IIa", 
~8 Sij_p. Ct. ~ev . 'a9 .. 
Insert One No. 79-134 Pages 5-6 
A restriction that regulates only the 
time, place, or manner of speech may imposed so 
long as its reasonable. But when regulation is 
based on the content of speech, governmental action 
must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that 
communication has not been prohibited "merely 
because public officials disapprove the speaker's 
views." Niemotko ~Maryland, 340 u.s. 268, 282 
(1951)(Frankfurter J., concurring in the result). 
As a consequence, we have emphasized that time, 
place, and manner regulations must be "applicable 
to all speech regardless of content." Erznozick v. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 u.s. 205, 209 (1975); see 
Carey v. Brown, u • s • _ ( 1 9 8 0 ) ( s 1 i p op "! at it /~ -/!} 
~). Governmental action that regulates speech on 
the basis of its subject matter "'slip[s] from the 
neutrality of time, place , and circumstance into a 
concern about content.'" Police Department~ 
Mosley, 408 u.s. 92, 99 (1972) quoting Kalven, The 
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox ~Louisiana, 1965 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 29. Therefore, a constitutionally 
permissible time, place, or manner restriction may 
not be based upon either the content or subject 
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Therefore, ll time, place, or manngr resttict;ion may not be 
basea1:1po:R the eontent of speech. See bi~(}~, 
- Ins. v. Willinge&ro , supra, at 93-94-j-sea-also Papish-v~ 
::;,::~issouri Curators, 4ro-tr:-s:-iW1;-6Te-fl~ 
The Commission does not retend that its action is unre-
lated to the content of bill inserts. n ee , 1 as under-
taken to suppress certain bill inserts precisely because they 
address controversial issues of public policy. The Commis-
sion allows inserts that present information to consumers on 
certain subjects, such as energy conservation measures, but it 
forbids the use of inserts that discuss public controversies. 
The Commission, with commendable candor, justifies its ban 
on the ground that consumers will benefit from receiving "use-
ful" information, but not from the prohibited information. 
See App. to Juris. St., at 66a-67a. The Commission's own 
rationale demonstrates that its action cannot be upheld as a 
content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation. 
The Commission next argues that Its order is acee~table 
~eattee it ettppt eeses all disctteeion ef n1:1eleltf' f39wer, mb etbQI" 
prG-er eon, in bill insei ts. The pwhibition, the Coffifftission 
coutet~di! , is rela,ted to s1:1bjeet ffiS;tter rather than to the views \ t J; 
of a partie1:1la:r epeaket. Because the t eg1:1la:tion does nQt j n ~ 
fa~ or either side of a political eentrovers)l , the Commission 
asserts that it is eonstit1:1tienally pemrtssible. 
Ne .. ·erthdess, the First Amendment's hostility to ·caotent-
ba!!Qa reg1:1httion extends not only to restrictions on par ticulat 
view}3ei:Rts, but a,lso te Sl:lf"Pessien of ~1:1blie dise1:1ssio:R of a,n 
entire tapi(l, In PBlise lJB'fJf1rtment v. Mosley , sapHt, a.t 96-, 
~e said that "tJre First Amendment means that govemment 
ha;s ne po ~ er to 1 eetr iet expression becattee of its tnessa,ge, its 
' municipality could not exempt labor 
•' 
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4. See also Linmark Associates, Inc. v. 
Willingboro, supra, at 93-94; Papish v. University 
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The Commission next argues that its order 
is acceptable because it applies to all discussion 
of nuclear power, whether pro or con, in bill 
inserts. The prohibition, the Commission contends, 
is related to subject matter rather than to the 
views of a particular speaker. Because the 
regulation does not favor either side of a 
political controversy, the Commission asserts that 
it does not unconstitutionally suppress freedom of 
speech. 
The First Amendment's hostility to 
content-based regulation extends not onl~o 
restrictions on particular viewpoints, rbut also to 
prohibition of public discussion of an entire 
topic. As a general matter, "the First Amendment 
means that the government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter or its content." Police Department 
~Mosley, supra, at 95 (1972): see Cox~ 
Lousisiana, supra, at 580-581 (Black, J., 
dissenting). In Mosley, we held that a 
. . 
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prohibition on picketing at a school even though the ban 
would have reached both pro- and anti-union demonstrations. 
If the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open, gov-
ernments must not be allowed to choose "which issues are 
worth discussing or debating. . . ." 408 U. S., at 96. See 
also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 214-215 
(1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 
510-511 (1969). To allow a government the choice of 
permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that r 
f g~vern~ne.nt cm~trol over t~e search ~or political truth. jV\sVTt 
~H HHiif be bMeel 1:ip9H tine e1:tbjeet ma.tter 6f Sf'eeeh.' The 
court below relied upon two cases in which this Court has 
recognized tha.t the government may bar from its facilities 
certain speech that would disrupt the legitimate governmental ~ 
purpose for which the property has been dedicated. 47 ~ 
N. Y. 2d. at 107, 390 N. E. 2d, a.t 755. In Greer v. Spock, 424 
U. S. 828 ( 1976), we held that the Federal Government could 
prohibit partisan political speech on a military base even 
though civilian speakers had been allowed to lecture on other Q) 
subjects. See id., at 838, n. 10.6 In Lehmany v. Shaker J 
~For example, when courts are asked to determine whether a. species 
of speech is covered by the Fir~t. Amendment, they must look to the 
content of the expre sian. See Central Httdson v. Public Service Com-
mission, No. 79-565, slip op., nt 4 (1980) (commercial speech); Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U. S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U. S. 568, 572-573 (1942) (fighting words). Compare Federal 
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Ji'oundation, 438 U. S. 726, 746--
747 (1978) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), and Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (opinion of S·rEVENS, J.), with Fed-
eral Communicatians Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, supra, at 761 
(opinion of PowELL, J.), id., at 762-763 (BHENNAN, J., dissenting), an~ 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, supra, at 87 (S•mwART, J., dissenting) 
(indecent speech) . 
8 The necessity for excluding partioan speech was based upon the tra-
ditional policy 1'of keeping official tnilitary activities . , . wholly free of 
,I 
,. 
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Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.), 
a plurality of the Court similarly concluded that a city transit 
system that rented space in its vehicles for commercial adver~ 
tising did not have to accept partisan political advertising. 
The municipality's refusal to accept political advertising was 
based upon fears that partisan advertisements might jeopard-
ize long term commercial revenue, that commuters would be 
subjected to political propaganda, and that acceptance of 
particular political advertisements might lead to charges of 
favoritism. Id., at 302, 304.7 r 
Greer and Lehman/ properly are viewed as narrow excep-
tions to the general prohibition against subject-matter dis-
tinctions. In both cases, the Court was asked to decide ~ 
whether a public facility was open to all speakers.8 Th~ 
plurality in Lehmann and the Court in Greer concluded that 
partisan political speech would disrupt the operation of gov-
ernmental facilities even though other forms of speech posed 
no such danger. }t 
The ~n.alysis of Greer and Lehma1' is not applicable to the 
entangleml nt with partisan political campaigns of any kind." !d., at 839. 
Thus, the Court 's decision construed the public right of access in light 
of " the unique character of the Government property upon which the 
expression is to take place." !d., at 842 (PowELL, J., concurring). ~ 
7 Mr. Justice Douglas, who concurred in the judgment in Lehman, , did /J/ 
not view "the content of the message as relevant either to the petitioner's / 
right to express it or to the commuters' right to be free from it." 418 
U. S., at 308. Rather, Justice Douglas upheld the municipality's actions 
because commuters were a captive audience. ld., at 306-308. The Con-
solidated Edison customers who receive bill inserts are not a capative 0/ 
audience. See infra, at 10-11. Four Justices dissented in Lehman/! ./ 
on the ground that the municipality could not discriminate among 
advertisers. 418 U. S., at 308, 309 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
8 Lehmanr/ and Greer represent only one category of this Court's cases ~ 
dealing wid rights of access to governmental property. Compare Tinker  
v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S., at 512-513, and Hague v. Com-
mittee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516 (opinion o 
Robert-s, J .), with Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. -39 (1966). 
, . . 
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'Commission's regulation of bill inserts. In both cases, a 
private party asserted a right of access to public facilities. 
Consolidated Edison has not asked to use the offices of the 
Commission as a forum from which to promulgate its views. 
Rather, it seeks merely to utilize its own billing envelopes to 
promulgate its views on controversial issues of public policy. 
'The Commission asserts that the billing envelope, as a neces-
sary adjunct to the operations of a public utility, is subject 
to the State's plenary control. To be sure, the State has a 
legitimate regulatory interest in controlling Consolidated Edi· 
son's activities, just as local governments always have been 
able to use their police powers in the public interest to regu-
late private behavior. See New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U. S. 
297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). But the Commission's at-
tempt to restrict the free expression of a private party cannot . 
be upheld by reliance upon precedent that rests op. }he special 
interests of a government in overseeing the use of its property. 
c 
·' 
Where a government restricts the speech of a private 
person, the state action may be sustained only if the govern-
ment can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means . 
of serving a compelling state interest. See First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 786; Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam). See also Bates v. Little ~ 
Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960).9 The Commission argues/ 
9 The Commission contends that its order should be judged under the · 
standard of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968), because . ------
the order "is only ::;econdarily concerned with the t>ubject matter o~ 
Consolidated Edison communications ... . " Brief for Appellee, at 9, 
n. 3. The O'Brien test applies to rrgulations that incidentally limit l 
speech where "t he governm<'ntal interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression ... . " 391 U. S., at 377. The bill int>ert prohibition 
does not further a governmental interest unrelated to the suppression 
of speech. Indeed, the court below justified the ban expressly on .the · 
basis that the speech might be harmful'to consumers. 47 N. 'Y. 2d; at '' 1 
106-107,390 N. E. 2d, at 755 • . 
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finally that its prohibition is necessary (i) to avoid forcing 
Consolidated Edison's views on a captive audience, (ii) to allo-
cate limited resources in the public interest, and (iii) to en-
sure that ratepayers do not subsidize the cost of the bill 
inserts. 
The State Court of Appeals largely based its approval of 
the prohibition upon its conclusion that the bill inserts in-
truded upon individual privacy.10 The court st9.ted that 
the Commission could act to protect the privacy of the util-
ity's customers because they have no choice whether to receive 
the insert and the views expressed in the insert may inflame 
their sensibilities. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 106-107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 
755. But the Court of Appeals erred in its assessment of the 
seriousness of the intrusion. 
Even if a short exposure to Consolidated Edison 's views 
may offend the sensibilities of some consumers, the ability of 
government "to shut off discourse solely to protect others from 
hearing it [is] dependent upon a showing that substantial ~ 
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolera-/ 
ble manner." Cohen v. California, 403 U. S., at 21. A less 
stringent analysis would permit a government to slight the 
First Amendment's role "in affording the public access to dis-
cussion, debate and the dissemination of information and 
ideas." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., 
at 783; see Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications 
10 The State Court of Appeals also referred to the alternative means by 
which Con~olidatPd Edison might promulgate its views on ccntroversial 
i~SUE'S of public policy. Although a time , place, and manner rP:>triction 
cannot be upheld without examination of alternative avenues of communi-
cation open to potential opeakers, see Linmark Associates v. ·willingboro, 
supra. at 93, we have consistently rejectE'd the suggPstion that a govern-
mE-nt may JUStify a content-based prohibition by ~bowing that spe·1kers 
have alternativE' means of expression. See Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc ., 425 U.S. 748, 757, n. 15 (1976) ; 
Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 556 (1975); 
Spence v. Washington, 418 U S. 405, 411, n . 4 (1974) (per curiam), / 
·. 
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Commiss·ion, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). 
Where a single speaker communicates to many listeners, 
the First Amendment does not permit the government to 
prohibit speech as intrusive unless the ucaptive" audience can-
not avoid objectionable speech. Q-
Passengers on public transportation, see Lehmanf v. Shaker 
Heights, 418 U. S., at 307-308 (Douglas, J., concurring in 
the judgment), or residents of a neighborhood disturbed by 
the raucous broadcasts from a passing soundtruck, cf. Kovacs 
v. Cooper, supra, may well be unable to escape an unwanted 
message. But customets who encounter an objectionable 
billing insert may "effectively avoid further bombardment of 
their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Cohen v. 
California. suvra, at 21. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405, 412 (1974) (per curiam). The customer of Consolidated 
Edison may escape exposure to objectionable material simply 
by transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket.11 
rhe Commission contends that because a billing envelope 
can accommodate only a limited amount of information, poli-
tical messages should not be allowed to take the place of in-
serts that promote energy conservation or safety, or that 
remi11d consnmers of their legal rights. The Commission 
relies upon Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 395 U. S. 367 (1969), in which the Court held 
11 Although this Court has recognized the special privacy interests that 
attach to per::~ons who seek serlusirn within their own homes, see Rowan 
v. Post Office Department, 397 U. S. 728, 737 (1970), the arrival of a 
billing envelope b hardly as intrusive as the visit of a door-to-door so-
licitor. Yet the Crurt ha::~ rejected the contention that a municipality 
may ban door-to-door solicitors became they may invade the privacy of 
hou::;eholds. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 146-147 (1943). Even 
if thPre were a compelling state interest in protecting consumers against 
overly intrusive bill inserts, it is prs~ible that the State could achieve its 
goal simply by requ:riPg Consolidat,ed Ed;::~on to stop sending bill inserts 
to the homes of objecting customers. See Rowan v . Post Office De-
partment, s·upra. 
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that the regulation of radio and television broadcast fre~ 
quencies permit the Federal Government to exercise um· '' 'll 
authority over speech. But billing envelopes differ from 
broadcast frequencies in two ways. First, a broadcaster com-
municates through use of a scarce, publicly owned resource. 
No person can broadca.st without a license, whereas all persons 
are free to send correspondence to private homes through the 
mails. Thus, it cannot be said that billing envelopes are a 
limited resource comparable to the broadcast spectrum. Sec-
ond, the Commission has not shown on the record before us 
that the presence of the bill inserts at issue would preclude 
the inclusion of other inserts that Consolidated Edison might 
be ordered lawfully to include in the billing envelope. Unlike 
radio or television stations broadcasting on a single frequency, 
multiple bill inserts will not result in a "cacophony of com-
peting voices/' !d., at 376. 
Finally, the Commission urges that its prohibition would 
prevent ratepayers from subsidizing the costs of policy-
oriented bill inserts. But the Commission did not base 
its order on an inability to allocate costs between the share-
h0lders of Consolidated Edison and the ratepayers. Rather, 
the Commission stated "that using bill inserts to proclaim a 
utility's viewpoint on controversial issues (even when the 
stockholder pays for it in full) is tantamount to taking ad-
vantage of a captive audience . . .. " App. to Juris. St., at 
43a (emphasis added). Accordingly, there is no basis on this 
record to assume that the Commission could not exclude the ~ 
cost of these bill inserts from the utility's rate base.12 Mere~ 
speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling state 
interest. See Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 389 
u.s. 217, 222-223 (1967) .18 
12 In its denial of petitions for rehearing, the Commission re-emphasized~ 
that it. would impose the ban without regard to allocation of costs between 
shareholders and ratepayers. App., at 67a, n. 1. 
13 The Commission also contends that ratepayers cannot be forced to 
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IV 
The Commission's suppression of bill inserts that discuss 
controversial issues of public policy directly infringes the I 
freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The state action is neither a valid time, place, 
or manner restriction, nor a permissible subject-matter regu-
lation, nor a uarrowly drawn prohibition justified by a com-
pelling state interest. Accordingly, the regulation is invalid. 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 795. 
The decision of the New York Court of Appeals is 
Reversed, 
mission has failed to demonstrate that such costs could not be allocated 
between shareholders and ratepayers, we have no occasion to decide 
whether the rule of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209 
(1977), would prevent Consolidated Edison from passing on to ratepayers 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether the First Amendment, 
as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is violated 
by an order of the Public Service Commission of the State 
of New York that prohibits the inclusion in monthly electric 
bills of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy. 
I 
The Consolidated Edison Company of New York, appel-
lant in this case, placed written material entitled "Independ-
ence Is Still a Goal, and Nuclear Power Is Needed To Win 
The Battle" in its January 1976 billing envelope. The bill 
insert stated Consolidated Edison's views on "the benefits of 
nuclear power," saying that they "far outweigh any potential 
risk" and that nuclear power plants are safe, economical, and 
clean. App., at 35. The utility also contended that increased 
use of nuclear energy would further this country's independ-
ence from foreign energy sources. 
In March 1976, the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. (NRDC) requested Consolidated Edison to enclose a 
rebuttal prepa.red by NRDC in its next billing envelope. !d., 
at 45-46. When Consolidated Edison refused, NRDC asked 
the Public Service Commission of the State of New York 
. \ 
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to open Consolidated Edison's billing envelopes to ·contrasting 
views on controversial issues of public importance. ld., at 
32-33. 
On February 17, 1977, the Commission, appellee here, denied 
NRDC's request, but prohibited "utilities from using bill 
inserts to discuss political matters, including the desirability 
of future development of nuclear power." !d., at 50. The 
Commission explained its decision in a Statement of Policy on 
Advertising and Promotion Practices of Public Utilities issued 
on February 25, 1977. "The Commission concluded that Con-
solidated Edison customers who receive bills containing inserts 
are a captive audience of diverse views who should not be 
subjected to the utility1s beliefs. Accordingly, the Commis-
sion barred utility companies from including bill inserts that 
express "their opinions or viewpoints on controversial issues 
of public policy." !d., at 43a. The Commission did not, 
however, bar utilities from sending bill inserts discussing 
topics that are not "controversial issues of public policy." 
The Commission later denied petitions for rehearing filed by 
Consolidated Edison and other utilities. ld., at 59a. 
Consolidated Edison sought review of the Commission's 
order in the New York state courts. The State Supreme 
Court, Special Term, held the order unconstitutional. 93 
Misc. 2d 313, 402 N. Y. S. 2d 551 (1978). But the State 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed, 63 A. D. 2d 
364, 407 N. Y. S. 2d 735 (1978), and the New York Court 
of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 47 N. Y. 2d 94, 390 
N. E. 2d 749 (1979). The Court of Appeals held that 
the order did not violate the Constitution because it was 
a valid time, place, and manner regulation designed to protect 
the privacy of Consolidated Edison's customers. ld., at 106-
!07, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. We noted probable jurisdiction, 
-U.S.- (1979). We reverse. 
II 
The restriction on bill inserts cannot be upheld on the: 
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ground that Consolidated Edison is not entitled to freedom 
of speech. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U. S. 765 (1978), we rejected the contention that a State 
may confine corporate speech to specified issues. That 
decision recognized that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech 
in terms of its capacity for infonning the public does not 
depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, 
association, union or individual." I d., at 777. Because the 
state action limited protected speech, we concluded that the 
regulation could not stand absent a showing of a compelling 
state interest. !d., at 786.1 
The First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no 
State shall "abridg[e] the freedom of speech." See Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-501 (1952). Free-
dom of speech is "indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth," Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 
( 1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and "the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market .... " Abrams v. United States, 250 
U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).2 The First 
and Fourteenth Amendments remove "governmental restraints 
1 Nor does Consolidated Edison's status as a privately owned but gov-
ernment regulated monopoly preclude its assertion of First Amendment 
rights . See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, No. 79-565 slip op., at 8-9 (1980) . We have recognized that the 
speech of heavily regulated businesses may enjoy constitutional protection. 
See, e. g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1 (1979); Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Council, 425 U. S. 748, 763-765 (1976) . 
Consolidated Edison's position as a regulated monopoly does not decrease 
the informative value of its opinions on critical public matters. See 
generally Public Media Center v. FCC,- U.S. App. D. C.-, 587 F. 
2d 1322, 1325, 1326 ( 1978); Pacific Gas & Electric Co . v. City of Berkeley, 
60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 127-129 (1976) . 
2 Freedom of speech also protects the individual's interest in self-
expression. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 
n. 12 (1978) ; see T. Emerson, The Systetn of Freedom of Expression 6 
(1970). 
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from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as 
to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each 
of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately 
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity .... " 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (19'71).8 
This Court has emphasized that the First Amendment 
"embraces a.t the least the liberty to discuss publicly and 
truthfully all matters of public concern .... " Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101-102 (1940); see Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). In the mailing that triggered the 
regulation at issue, Consolidated Edison advocated the use 
of nuclear power. The Commission has limited the means 
by which Consolidated Edison may participate in the public 
debate on this question and other controversial issues of 
national interest and importance. Thus, the Commission's 
prohibition of discussion of controversial issues strikes at the 
heart of the freedom to speak. 
III 
The Commission's ban on bill im:erts is not, of cot;rse, 
invalid merely because it imposes a limitation upon speech. 
See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 786. 
We must consider whether the State can demonstrate thnt its 
regulation is constitutionally permissible. The Commission's· 
arguments require us to consider three theories that might 
justify the state action. We must determine whether the' 
prohibition is (i) a reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tion , (ii) a permissible subject-matter regulation , or (iii) a 
narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state interest'. 
A 
This Court has recognized the validity of reasonable time, 
place, or manner regulations that serve a significant govern-· 
mental interest and leave ample alternative channels for com-
3 Sec a h:o A. Meikleiohn, Political Freedom 35-3.6 ( 1965) . 
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munication. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 
U. S. 85, 93 (1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 771 
(1976). See also Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, at 104 (Black, J., 
dissenting). In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 563 (1941), 
this Court upheld a licensing requirement for parades through 
city streets. The Court recognized that the ·regulation, which 
was based on time, place, or manner criteria, served the ·munic-
ipality's legitimate interests in regulating traffic, securing pub-
lic order, and insning that simultaneous parades did not pre-
vent all speakers from being heard. Jd., at 576. Similatly, 
in Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 ( 1972), we upheld an 
ant;noise regulation prohibiting demonstrations that would 
disturb the good order of an educational facility. ·The nar-
rowly drawn restriction constitutionally advanced the city's 
intere~t "in having an undisrupted school session conducive 
to students' learning .... " I d., at 119. ·Thus, the essence 
of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recognition 
that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, 
may frustrate legitimate governmental goals. No matter 
what its message, a roving soundtrack that blares at 2 a. m. 
tlist•1rbs neighborhood tranquility. 
A restriction that regulates only the time, place or manner 
of speech may imposed so long as its reasonable. But when 
regulation is based on the COIItent of speech, governmental 
action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that 
communication has not been proh;bited "merely because 
public officials disapprove the speaker's views." Niemotko 
v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in the result). As a consequence, we have empha-
sized that time, place. and manner regulations must be "ap-
plicable to all speech regardless of content." Erznoznick v. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 209 (1975); see Carey v. 
Brown, - U. S. - (1980) (slip op., at 14-15). Govern-
mental action that regulates speech on the basis of its subject 
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matter "'slip[s] from the neutrality of time, place, and cir~ 
cumstances into a concern about content.'" Police Depart~ 
rnent v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 99 (1972), quoting Kalven, The 
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 29. Therefore, a constitutionally permissible time, 
place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either 
the content or subject matter of speech.4 
The Commission does not pretend that its action is unre~ 
lated to the content or subject matter of bill inserts. Indeed, \ 
it has undertaken to supress certain bill inserts precisely be-
cause they address controversial issues of public policy. The 
Commission allows inserts that present information to con-
sumers on certain subjects, such as energy conservation meas-
ures, but it forbids the use of inserts that discuss public 
controversies. The Commission. with commendable candor, 
justifies its ban ou the ground that consumers will benefit 
from receiving "useful" information, but not from the pro~ 
hibited information. See App. to Jur. St., at 66a-67a. The 
Commission's own rationale demonstrates that its action can-
not be upheld as a content-neutral time, place, or manner 
regulation. 
B 
The Commission next argues that its order is acceptable 
because it applies to all discussion of nuclear power. whether J 
pro or con, in bill inserts. The prohibition, the Commission 
contends, is related to subject matter rather than to the 
views of a particular speaker. Because the regulation does 
1wt favor either side of a political controversy, the Commis-
sion asserts that it does not unconstitutionally suppress free-
dom of speech. 
The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regula-
tion extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, 
~See also Linmark Associates. Inc. v. Will-ingboro, sup'ra, at 93-94; I 
Papish Y. University of Missow·i Curators, 410 U. S. 667, 670 (1970)1 
(per cu1·iam), 
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but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.) 
As a general matter, "the First Amendment means that the 
gowrmnent has no power to restrict expression because of its 
messagE', its ideas. its subject matter or its content." Police I 
Department v. Mosley, supra, at 95 (1972); sec Cox v. 
LouisianAt, supra, at 580-581 (Black, J., dissenting). In 
Mosley, we held that a municipality could not exempt labor 
picketing from a general prohibition on picketing at a school 
even though the ban would have reached both pro- and anti-
union demonstrations. 1f the market place of ideas is to 
remain free and open, governments must not be allowed to 
choose "which issues are worth discussing or debating. . .. " 
408 U. S .. at 96. See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
supra, at 214-215 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dis-
trict, 393 U. S. 503. 510-511 (1969). To allow a government 
the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be 
to allow that government control over the search for political 
truth. 
Nevertheless. govemmental regulation based on subject I 
mattPr has been approved in narrow circumstauces." The 
court below relied upon two cases in which this Court has 
recognized that the government may bar from its facilities 
certain speech that would disrupt the legitimate governmental 
~ For example, when courts are asked to determine whether a species 
of speech is covered by the First Amendment, they must look to the 
content of the expression. See Central Hudson v. Public Service Com-
mission, No. 79-565, slip op., at 4 (1980) (commercial speech); Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U. S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U. S. 568, 572-573 (1942) (fighting words). Compare Federal 
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 746--
747 (1978) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), and Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), with Fed-
eral CommU?~icatians Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, supm, at 761 
(opinion of PowELL, J.), id., at 762-763 (BRENNAN, ·J., dissenting), and 
Young v. American Mini 7'heatres, supra, at 87 (STEWART, J., dissenting) 
(indecent speech). 
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purpORf' for whi<'h t.hf' pmp<'rt~r hn,c; h<'en dedicated. 47 
N. Y. 2d. at 107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. In Gree1· v. Spoclc, 424 
U. S. 828 (1976), we held that the Federal Government could 
prohibit partisan political speech on a military base even 
though civilian speakers had been allowed to lecture on other 
subjects. Sec id., at 838. n .. 10.{: In Lehman v. Shaker 
Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.), 
a plurality of the Court similarly concluded that a city transit 
system that rented space in its vehicles for commercial adver-
tising did not have to accept partisan political advertising. 
The municipality's refusal to accept political advertising was 
based upon fears that partisan advertisements might jeopard-
ize long term commercial revenue, that commuters would be 
subjected to political propaganda, and that acceptance of 
particular political advertisements might lead to charges of 
favoritism. ld., at 302, 304.7 
Greer and Lehaman properly are viewed as narrow excep-
tions to the general prohibition against subject-matter dis-
tinctions. In both cases, the Court was asked to decide 
whether a public facility was open to all spea.kers.8 The 
6 The necessity for excluding partisan speech was based upon the tra-
ditional policy "of keeping official military activities ... wholly free of 
entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind." Id .. at 839. 
Thus, the Court's decision construed the public right of access in light 
of "the unique character of the Government property upon which the 
expression is to take place." Td., at 842 (PowELL, J., concurring). 
7 1\Ir . .Tn:<lirr Dong:laf', who ronrurrf'd in the judgmf'nt in Lehman , clicl 
not view " the content. of the message as relevant either to the petitioner's 
right to express it or to the commuters' right to be free from it." 418 
U. S., at 308. Rather, Justice Douglas upheld the municipality's actions · 
because commuters were a captive audience. ld., at 306-308. The Con-
solidated Edison customers who receive bill inserts are not a capative 
nudit·m·r. Rrr infra. at 10-11. Four .Tusticrfi di::;"rntf'd in Lehman 
on the ground that tl1e municipality could not discriminate among 
advertisers. 418 U. S., at 308, 309 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
8 Lehman nnd Greer rPprescnt only one categor~' of thi:< Courf 'R cn:ses 
dealing with rights of access to governmental property. Compare Tinker 
v. l)es Moines School Dist1ict, 393 U. S., at 512-513, and Hague v. Com- · 
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plurality in Lehman/ and the Court in Greer concluded that 
partisan political speech would disrupt the operation of gov• 
'ernmental facilities even though other forms of speech posed 
no such danger. 
The analysis of Greer and Lehman is not applicable to the 
Commission's regulation of bill inserts. in both cases, a 
private party asserted a rl.ght of access to public facilities. 
Consolidated Edison has not asked to use the offices of the 
Commission as a forum from which to promulgate its views. 
Rather, it seeks merely to utilize its own billing envelopes to 
promulgate its views on controversial issues of public policy. 
The Commission asserts that the billing envelope, as a neces-
sary adjunct to the operations of a public utility, is subject 
to the State's plenary control. To be sure, the State has a 
legitimate regulatory interest in controliing Consolidated Edi-
son's activities, just as iocal governments always have been 
able to use their police powers in the public interest to regu-
late private behavior. See New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U. S. 
297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). But the Commission's at-
tempt to restrict the free expression of a private party cannot 
be upheld by reliance upon precedent that rests on the special 
interests of a government in overseeing the use of its property. 
c 
Where a government restricts the speech of a private 
'person, the state action may be sustained only if the govern-
ment ca.n show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means 
of serving a compelling state interest. See First N ationai 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 786; Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam). See also Bates v. Little 
Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960).9 The Commission argues 
mittee for Industrial 01'ganization, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516 (opinion of 
Roberts, J.), with Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
0 The Commission contends that its order should be judged under the 
standard of United States v. O'Bnen, 391 U. S. 367, 377 ( 1968), because 
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finally that its prohibition is necessary (i) to avoid forcing 
Consolidated Edison's views on a captive audience, (ii) to allo-
cate limited resources in the public interest, and (i:i) to en·· 
sure that ratepayers do not subsidize the cost of the bill 
inserts. 
The State Court of Appeals largely based its approval of 
the prohibition upon its conclusion that the b:Il inserts in-
truded upon individual privacy.10 The court st~ted that 
the Commission could act to protect the privacy of the util-
ity's customers because they have no choice whether to receive 
the insert and the views expressed in the insert may inflame 
their sensibilities. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 106-107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 
755. But the Court of Appeals erred in its assessment of the 
seriousness of the intrusion. 
Even if a short exposure to Consolidated Edison's views 
may offend the sensibilities of some consumers, the ability of 
government "to shut off discourse solely to protect others from 
hearing it [is] dependent upon a showing that sub~::tantial 
priva.cy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolera-
Consolidated Edison communications .... " Brief for Appellee, at 9, 
n. 3. The O'Brien test applies to regulations that incidentally l'mit" 
speech where "the governmentnl interest is unrelated to the suppre,:sion· 
of free expression .... " 391 U. S., 'at 377. The bill insert prohibition 
does not further a governmental interest unrelated to the suppression 
of speech. Indeed, the court below justified the ban expressly on the· 
basis that the speech might be harmful to consumers. 47 N. Y. 2d, at · 
106-107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. 
10 The State Court of Appeals also referred to the alternative means by· 
which Consolidated Edison might promulgate its views on ccntroversial' 
issues of public policy. Although a time, place, and manner restriction 
cannot be upheld without examination of alternative avenues of communi- · 
cation open to potential speakers, see Linmark Associates v. Willingboro, 
supra, at 93, we have consistently rejected the suggestion that a govern-
ment may justify a content-based prohibition by showi1~g that spe3kerer 
have alternative means of expression. See Virginia State Board of Phar- · 
macy v. Virainia Citizens Council, Inc ., 425 U. S. 748, 757, n. 15 (1976) ; · 
Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 556 (1975) ;; 
Spenc~ v. WashinQ.ton, 418 U. S. 405, 411, n. 4 (1974) (per curiam\ .. 
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ble manner." Cohen v. California, 403 U. S., at 21. A less 
stringent ana.lysis would permit a government to slight the 
First Amendment's role "in affording the public access to dis-
cussion, debate and the dissemination of information and 
ideas." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., 
at 783; see Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). 
Where &. single speaker communicates to many listeners, 
the First Amendment does not permit the government to 
prohibit speech as intrusive unless the "captive" audience can-
not avoid objectionable speech. 
Passengers ou public transportation. see Lehman v. Shaker 
Heights, 418 U. S., at 307-308 (Douglas, J., concurring in 
the judgment), or residents of a neighborhood disturbed by 
the raucous broadcasts from a passing soundtruck, cf. Kovacs 
v. Cooper, supra, may well be unable to escape an unwanted 
message. But customers who encounter an objectionable 
billing insert may "effectively avoid further bombardment of 
their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Cohen v. 
California. suvra, at 21. See Spence v. Washinqton, 418 U.S. 
40.5, 412 (1974) , (per curiam). The customer of Consolidated 
Edison may escape exposure to objectionable material simply 
by transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket.n 
The Commission contends that because a billing envelope 
n Although this Court has reccgnized the snecial privacy interests that 
at tnrh to nersons who seek seclusirm within their own homes, see Rowan 
v. Post Office Department, 397 U. S. 728, 737 (1970), the arrival of a 
billing envelope is hardly as intrusive as the visit of a doer-to-door so-
licitor. Yet the Crurt has rejected the rontention that a municipality 
may ban door-to-door solicitors became they may invade the privacy or 
h'luseholds. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 146-147 (1943) . Even 
if there were a c0mpelling state interest in protecting ccnsumers against 
overl:r intrusive bill inserts, it is pcssible that the State could achieve its-
goal simply by requ'rirg Consolidated Edisr n to stop sending bill inserts-
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can accommodate only a limited amount of information, poli-
tical messages should not be al.lowed to take the place of in-
serts that promote energy conservation or safety, or that 
remind consumers of their legal rights. The Commission 
relies upon Red Lion Broadpasting v. F,ederal Communications 
Commission, 395 U. S. 367 (1969) , in which the Court held 
that the regulation of radio and television broadcast fre-
quencies permit the Federal Government to exercise unusual 
authority over speech. But billing envelopes differ from 
broadcast frequencies in two ways. first, a broadcaster com-
municates through use of a scarce, publicly owned resource. 
No person can broadcast without a license, whereas all persons 
are free to send correspondence to private homes through the 
mails. Thus, it cannot be said that billing envelopes are a 
Umited resource comparable to the broadcast spectrum. Sec-
ond, the Commission has not shown on the record before us 
that the presence of the bill inserts at issue would preclude 
the inclusion of other inserts that Consolidated Edison might 
be ordered lawfully to include in the billing envelope. Unlike 
radio or television stations broadcasting on a single frequency, 
multiple bill inserts will not result in a "cacophony of com-
peting voices." !d., at 376. 
Finally, the Commission urges that its prohibition would 
prevent ratepayers from subsidizing the costs of policy-
oriented bill inserts. But the Commission did not base 
its order on an inability to allocate costs between the share-
h0lders of Consolidated Edison and the ratepayers. Rather, 
the Commission stated "that using bill inserts to proclaim a 
utility's viewpoint on controversial issues (even when the 
stockholder pays for it in full) is tantamount to taking ad-
vantage of a captive audience ... . " App. to Juris. St., at 
43a (emphasis added) . Accordingly, there is no basis on this 
record to assume that the Commission could not exclude the 
cost of these bill inserts from the utility's rate base.12 Mere 
12 ~n its denial of petitions for rehearing, the Commission re-emphasize~ 
. . 
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speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling state 
interest. See Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 389 
u.s. 217, 222-223 (1967).13 
IV 
The Commission's suppression of bill inserts that discuss 
controversial issues of public policy directly infringes the 
freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The state action is neither~:~- valid time, place, 
or manner restriction, nor a permissible subject-matter regu-
lation, nor a narrowly drawn prohibition jvstified by a com-
pelling state interest. Accordingly, the regulation is invalid, 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 795. 
The decision of the New York Court of'Appeals is 
Reversed, 
that it would impose the ban without regard to allocation of costs between 
shareholders and ratepayers. App., at 67a, n. 1. 
18 The Commission also contends that ratepayers cannot be forced to 
support the costs of Consolidated Edison's bill inserts. Because the Com-
mission has failed to demonstrate that such costs could not be allocated 
between shareholders and ratepayers, we have no occasion to decide 
whether the rule of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 201) 
(1977), would prevent Consolidated Edison from passing on to ratepayers 
•the costs of bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public policy. 
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The question in this case is whether the First Amendment, 
as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is violated 
by an order of the Public Service Commission of the State 
of New York that prohibits the inclusion in monthly electric 
bills of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy. 
I 
The Consolidated Edison Company of New York, appel-
lant in this case, placed written material entitled "Independ-
ence Is Still a Goal, and Nuclear Power Is Needed To Win 
The Battle" in its January 1976 billing envelope. The bill 
insert stated Consolidated Edison's views on "the benefits of 
nuclear power," saying that they "far outweigh any potential 
risk" and that nuclear power plants are safe, economical, and 
clean. App., at 35. The utility also contended that increased 
use of nuclear energy would further this country's independ-
ence from foreign energy sources. 
In March 1976, the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. (NRDC) requested Consolidated Edison to enclose a 
rebuttal prepared by NRDC in its next billing envelope. !d., 
at 45-46. When Consolidated Edison refused, NRDC asked 
the Public Service Commission of the State of New York 
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to open Consolidated Edison's billing envelopes to contrasting 
views on controversial issues of public importance. ld., at 
32-33. 
On February 17, 1977, the Commission, appellee here, denied 
NRDC's request, but prohibited "utilities from using bill 
inserts to discuss political matters, including the desirability 
of future development of nuClear power." /d., at 50. The 
Commission explained its decision in a Statement of Policy on 
Advertising and Promotion Practices of Public Utilities issued 
on February 25, 1977. 'The Commission concluded that Con-
solidated Edison customers who receive bills containing inserts 
are a captive audience of diverse views who should not be 
subjected to the utility's beliefs. Accordingly, the Commis-
sion barred utility companies from including bill inserts that 
express "their opinions or viewpoints on controversial issues 
of public policy." ld., at 43a. The Commission did not, 
however, bar utilities from sending bill inserts discussing 
topics that are not "controversial issues of public policy." 
The Commission later denied petitions for rehearing filed by 
Consolidated Edison and other utilities. ld., at 59a. 
Consolidated Edison sought review of the Commission's 
order in the New York state courts. The State Supreme 
Court, Special Term, held the order unconstitutional. 93 
Misc. 2d 313, 402 N. Y. S. 2d 551 (1978). But the State 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed, 63 A. D. 2d 
364, 407 N. Y. S. 2d 735 (1978) , and the New York Court 
of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 47 N. Y. 2d 94, 390 
N. E. 2d 749 ( 1979) . The Court of Appeals held that 
the order did not violate the Constitution because it was 
a valid time, place, and manner regulation designed to protect 
the privacy of Consolidated Edison's customers. ld., at 106-
107, 390 N. E. 2d , at 755. We noted probable jurisdiction, 
-U.S. - (1979) . We reverse. 
II 
The restriction on bill inserts cannot be upheld on the: 
~-
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ground that Consolidated Edison is not entitled to freedom 
of speech. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U. S. 765 (1978) , we rejected the contention that a State 
may confine corporate speech to specified issues. That \ 
decision recognized that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech 
in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not 
depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, 
association, union or individual." I d., at 777. Because the 
state action limited protected speech, we concluded that the 
regulation could not stand absent a showing of a compelling 
state interest. !d. , at 786.1 
The First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no 
State shall "abridg[e] the freedom of speech." See Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-501 (1952). Free-
dom of speech is "indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth ," Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 
( 1927) (Brandeis, J. , concurring), and "the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market .... " Abrams v. United States, 250 
U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).2 The First 
and Fourteenth Amendments remove "governmental restraints 
1 Nor does Consolidated Edison's status as a privately owned but gov-
ernment regulated monopoly preclude its assertion of First Amendment 
rights. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, No. 79-565 slip op., at 8- 9 ( 1980) . We have recognized that the 
speech of heavily regulated businesses may enjoy constitutional protection. 
See, e. g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1 (1979); Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Council, 425 U. S. 748, 763-765 (1976) . 
Consolidated Edison's position as a regulated monopoly does not decrease 
the informntive value of its opinions on critical public matters. See 
generally Public Media Center v. FCC, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 587 F. 
2d 1322, 1325, 1326 (1978) ; Pacific Gas & Electric Co . v. City of Berkeley, 
60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 127-129 (1976) . 
2 Freedom of speech also protects the individual 's interest in self. 
expression. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 777, 
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from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as 
to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each 
of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately 
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity .... " 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24 (19.71).3 
This Court has emphasized that the First Amendment 
((embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and 
truthfully all matters of public concern .... " Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940); see Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). In the mailing that triggered the 
regulation at issue, Consolidated Edison advocated the use 
of nuclear power. The Commission has limited the means 
by which Consolidated Edison may participate in the public 
debate on this question and other controversial issues of 
national interest and importance. Thus, the Commission's 
prohibition of discussion of controversial issues strikes at the 
heart of the freedom to speak. 
III 
The Commission's ban on bill imerts is not, of cot:rse, 
invalid merely because it imposes a limitation upon sperch. 
See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 786'. 
We must consider whether the State can demonstrate that its· 
regulation is constitutionally permissible. The Commission's· 
arguments require us to consider three theories that might 
justify the state action. We must determine whether the' 
prohibition is (i) a reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tion, (ii) a permissible subject-matter regulation , or (iii) a 
narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state interest .. 
A 
This Court has recognized the validity of reasonable time, 
place, or manner regulations that serve a significant govern-· 
mental interest and leave ample alternative channels for com-
3 Se~ also A. Mcikleiohn, Political Freedom 35-36 (1965). 
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munication. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 
U. S. 85, 93 ( 1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 771 
(1976). Sec also Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, at 104 (Black, J., 
dissenting). In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 563 (1941), 
this Court upheld a licensing requirement for parades through 
city streets. The Court recognized that the regulation, which 
was based on time, place, or manner criteria, served the munic-
ipality's legitimate interests in regula.ting traffic, securing pub-
lic order, and insning that simultaneous parades did not pre-
vent all speakers from being heard. ld., at 576. Similarly, 
in Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972), we upheld an 
ant;noise regulation prohibiting demonstrations that would 
disturb the good order of an educational facility. ·The nar-
rowly drawn restriction constitutionally advanced the city's 
interest "in having an undisrupted school session conducive 
to students' learning .... " !d., at 119. ·Thus, the essence 
of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recognition 
that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, 
may frustrate legitimate governmental goals. No matter 
what its message, a roving soundtrack that blares at 2 a: m. 
dist•1rbs neighborhood tranquility. 
A restriction that regulates only the time, place or manner 
of speech may imposed so long as its reasonable. But when 
regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental 
action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that 
communication has not been proh;bited "merely because 
public officials disapprove the speaker's views." Niemotko 
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268. 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in the result). As a consequence, we have empha-
sized that time, place. and manner regulations must be "ap-
l)licable to all speech regardless of content." Erznoznick v. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 209 (1975); see Carey v. 
Brown, - U. S. - (1980) (slip op., at 14-15). Govern-
mental action that regulates speech on the basis of its subject 
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matter "'slip[s] from the neutrality of time, place, and cir~ 
cumstances into a concern about conteut.' " Police Depart~ 
rnent v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 99 (1972), quoting Kalven, The 
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 29. Therefore, a constitutionally permissible time, 
place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either 
the content or subject matter of speech.4 
The Commission does not pretend that its action is unre-
lated to the content or subject matter of bill inserts. Indeed, 
it has undertaken to supress certain bill inserts precisely be-
cause they address controversial issues of public policy. The 
Commission allows inserts that present information to con-
sumers on certain subjects, such as energy conservation meas-
ures, but it forbids the use of inserts that discuss public 
controversies. The Commissiou, with commendable candor, 
justifies its ban on the ground that consumers will benefit 
from receiving "useful" information, but not from the pro-
hibited information. See App. to Jur. St., at 66a-67a. The 
Commission's own rationale demonstrates that its action can-
not be upheld as a content-neutral time, place, or manner 
regulation. 
B 
The Commission next argues that its order is acceptable 
because it applies to all discussion of uuclear power. whether I 
pro or con , in bill inserts. The prohibition, the Commission 
contends, is related to subject matter rather than to the 
views of a particular speaker. Because the regulation does 
not favor either side of a political controversy, the Commis-
sion asserts that it does not unconstitutionally suppress free- \ 
dom of speech. 
The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regula-
tion extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, 
1 See al~o L-iumark Associates. Inc. v. Willingboro , supm, at 93- 94; \ 
Papish v. University of Missouri Cw·ators, 410 U. S. 667, 670 (1970~, 
(pel' cu1·iam), 
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but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic. ( 
As a gE>nPral matter, "the First Amendment means that the 
gov<'rnment has no power to restrict expression because of its 
messagE', its ideas. its subject matter or its content." Police 
Department v. Mosley, supra, at 95 (1972); sec Cox v. 
Louisiana, supra, at 580-581 (Black, J., dissenting). In 
Mosley, we held that a municipality could not exempt labor 
picketing from a general prohibition on picketing at a school 
even though the ban would have reached both pro- and anti-
union demonstrations. Tf the market place of ideas is to 
remain fref' and open, governments must not be allowed to 
choosE' "which issues are worth discussing or debating. . .. " 
408 U. R.. at 96. See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
supra, at 214-215 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dis-
trict, 393 U. S. 503. 510-511 (1969). To allow a government 
the choict> of pE-rmissible subjects for public debate would be 
to allow that government control over the search for political 
truth. 
Nevertheless. govemment~l rPgulation. based on subject \ 
mattf'r has been approved m narrow CJrcumstauces." The 
court below relied upon two cases in which this Court has 
recognized that the government may bar from its facilities 
certain speech that would disrupt the legitimate governmental 
s For example, when courts are asked to determine whether a species 
of speech is covered by the First Amendment, they must look to the 
content of the expression. See Central 1-htdson v. Public Service Com-
mission, No. 79-565, slip op., at 4 (1980) (commercial speech); Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U. S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U. S. 568, 572-573 (1942) (fighting words). Compare Federal 
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 746-
747 (1978) (opinion of ·STEVENS, J.) , and Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, 427 U. S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), with Fed-
eral Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, supra, at 761 
(opinion of PowELL, J.), id., at 762-763 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), and 
Young v. American Mini 1'heatres, supra, at 87 (STEWART, J ., dissenting) 
(indecent speech). 
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purpoAf' for whi<'h t.hE> p1•oprrt:v hnl' bPen dedicatPd. 47 
N . Y. 2d, a.t 107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. In Greer v. Spack, 424 
U.S. 828 (1976), we held that the Federal Government could 
prohibit partisan political speech on a milita.ry base even 
though civilian speakers had been allowed to lecture on other 
subjects. Sec id., at 838. n. 10.(; In Lekman v. Shaker 
Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.), 
a plurality of the Court similarly concluded that a city transit 
system that rented space in its vehicles for commercial adver-
tising did not have to accept partisan political advertising. 
The municipality's refusal to accept political advertising was 
based upon fears that partisan advertisements might jeopard-
ize long term commercial revenue, that commuters would be 
subjected to political propaganda, and that acceptance of 
particular political advertisements might lead to charges of 
favoritism. ld., at 302, 304.7 
Greer and Lehaman properly are viewed as narrow excep-
tions to the general prohibition against subject-matter dis-
tinctions. In both cases, the Court was asked to decide 
whether a public facility was open to all speakers.8 The 
~The necessity for excluding partisan speech was based upon the tra-
ditional policy "of keeping official military activities ... wholly free of 
entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind." !d .. at 839. 
Thus, the Court's decision construed the public right of access in light 
of "the unique character of the Government property upon which the 
expression is to take place." Td., at 842 (PowELL, J., concurring). 
7 l\T r . .Tu:,; t irC' DonglnR, who eonrurrrd in the judgment in Dehman, rlid 
not view "the content of the message as relevant either to the petitioner's 
right to express it or to the commuters' right to be free from it." 418 
U. S., at 308. Ratl!Cr, Justice Douglas upheld the municipality's actions· 
because commuters were a captive audience. ld., at 306-308. The Con-
solidated Edison customers who receive bill inserts are not a capative 
audit> JWr. Sre infra, at 10-11. Four ,Tw;t irC's cliH:'entPd in Lehman 
on the ground that the municipality could not discriminate among 
advertisers. 418 U. S., at 308, 309 (BRENNAN, J ., dissenting) . 
8 Lehman and G1'eer rC'prescnt only one cutegor~' of thi" Court':< cu:;es 
dealing with rights of access to governmental property. Compare Tinker 
v. l)es Moines School District, 393 U.S., at 512- 513, and Hague v. Com-· 
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plurality in Lehmani and the Court in Greer concluded that 
partisan political speech would disrupt the operation of gov• 
-ernmental facilities even though other forms of speech posed 
no such danger. 
The analysis of Greer and Lehman is not applicable to the 
Commission's regulation of bill inserts. in both cases, a 
·private party asserted a r!ght of access to pubiic facilities. 
Consolidated Edison has not asked to 'use the offices of the 
Commission as a forum from which to promulgate its views. 
Rather, it seeks merely to 'utilize its own biliing enveiopes to 
promulgate its views on controversial issues of pubiic policy. 
The Commission asserts that the billing envelope, as a neces-
sary adjunct to the operations of a public utiiity, is subject 
to the State's plenary control. To be sure, the State has a 
legitimate reguiatory interest in controiiing Consolidated Edi-
son's activities, just as iocal governments aiways have been 
able to use their police powers in the public interest to regu-
late private behavior. See New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U. S. 
297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). But the Commission's at-
tempt to restrict the free expression of a private party cannot 
he upheld by reliance upon precedent that rests on the special 
interests of a government in overseeing the use of its property. 
c 
Where a government restricts the speech of a private 
'person, the state action may be sustained only if the govern-
ment can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means 
of serving a compelling state interest. See First N ationai 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 786; Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam). See also Bates v. Little 
Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960).9 The Commission argues 
mittee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516 (opinion of 
Roberts, J.) , with Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966). 
9 The Commission contends that it'l order should be judged under the 
standard of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968), because 
the order "is only secondarily concerned with the subject matter o.r 
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finally that its prohibition is necessary (i) to avoid forci.ng 
Consolidated Edison's views on a captive audience, (ii) to allo-
cate limited resources in the public interest, and (i:i) to en·· 
sure that ratepayers do not subsidize the cost of the bill 
inserts. 
The State Court of Appeals largely based its approval of 
the prohibition upon its conclusion that the b;IJ inserts in-
truded upon individual privacy.10 The court st~ted that 
the Commission could act to protect the privacy of the util-
ity's customers because they have no choice whether to receive 
the insert and the views expressed in the insert may inflame 
their sensibilities. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 106-107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 
755. But the Court of Appeals erred in its assessment of the 
seriousness of the intrusion. 
Even if a short exposure to Consolidated EdiEon's views 
may offend the sensibilities of some consumers, the ability of 
government "to shut off discourse solely to protect others from 
hearing it [is] dependent upon a showing that substantial 
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolera-
Consolidated Edison communications .... " Brief for Appellee, at 9, 
n. 3. The O'Brien test applirs to regulations that incidentally J:mit' 
speech where "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression· 
of free expression .... " 391 U. S., 'at 377. The bill insert prohibition 
does not further a governmental interest unrelated to the suppression 
of speech. Indeed, the court below justified the ban expressly on the· 
basis that the speech might be harmful to consumers. 47 N. Y. 2d, at · 
106-107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. 
10 The State Court of Appeals also referred to the alternative means by· 
which Consolidated Edison might promulgate its views on ccntroversial' 
issues of public policy. Although a time, place, and manner restriction 
cannot be upheld without examination of alternative avenues of communi- · 
cation open to potential speakers, see Linmark Associates v. Willingboro, 
supra, at 93, we have consistently rejected the suggestion that a govern-
ment may justify a content-based prohibition by showi1~g that spe!.lkers· 
have alternative means of expression. See Virginia State Board of Phar- · 
macy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc. , 425 U.S. 748, 757, n . 15 (1976); 
Southeastern Promotions Ltd . v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 54{3, 556 (1975) ;; 
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ble manner." Cohen v. California, 403 U. S., at 21. A less 
stringent analysis would permit a government to slight the 
First Amendment's role "in affording the public access to dis-
cussion, debate and the dissemination of information and 
ideas." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., 
at 783; see Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal C01nmunications 
Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). 
Where a. single speaker communicates to many listeners, 
the First Amendment does not permit the government to 
prohibit speech as intrusive unless the "captive" audience can-
not avoid objectionable speech. 
Passengers on public transportation, see Lehman v. Shaker 
Heights, 418 U. S., at 307-308 (Douglas, J., concurring in 
the judgment), or residents of a neighborhood disturbed by 
the raucous broadcasts from a passing soundtruck, cf. Kovacs 
v. Cooper, supra, may well be unable to escape an unwanted 
message. But customers who encounter an objectionable 
billing insert may "effectively avoid further bombardment of 
their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Cohen v. 
California. suvra, at 21. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
40.~. 412 (1974) , (per curiam). The customer of Consolidated 
Edison may escape exposure to objectionable material simply 
by transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket.11 
The Commission contends that because a billing envelope 
11 Although this Court has reccgnized the special privacy interests that 
attarh to J)ersons who seek serlusir.n within their own homes, see Rowan 
v. Post Office Department, 397 U. S. 728, 737 (1970), the arri\'al of a 
billing envelope is hardly as intrusive as the visit of a doer-to-door so-
licitor. Yet the Ccurt has rejected the contention that a. municipality 
may ban door-to-door solicitors became they may invade the privacy or 
h '~useholds. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 146-147 (1943). Even 
if there were a c0mpelling state interest in protecting consumers against 
overly intrusive bill inserts, it is pC's~ible that the State could achieve it~ 
goal simply by requ'rirg Consolidated Edisrn to stop sending bill insertS' 
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can accommodate only a limited amount of information, poli· 
tical messages should not be allowed to take the place of in. 
serts that promote energy conservation or safety, or that 
remind consumers of their legal rights. The Commission 
relies upon Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications 
I • 
Commission, 395 U. S. 367 (1969), in which the Court held 
that the regulation of radio and television broadcast fre-
quencies permit the Federal Government to exercise unusual 
authority over speech. But billing envelopes differ from 
broadcast frequencies in two ways. :{i'irst, a broadcaster com-
municates through use of a scarce, publicly owned resource. 
No person can broadcast without a license, whereas all persons 
are free to send correspondence to private homes through the 
mails. Thus, it cannot be said that billing envelopes are a 
limited resource comparable to the broadcast spectrum. Sec-
ond, the Commission has not shown on the record before us 
that the presence of the bill inserts at issue would preclude 
the inclusion of other inserts that Consolidated Edison might 
be ordered lawfully to include in the billing envelope. Unlike 
radio or television stations broadcasting on a single frequency, 
multiple bill inserts will not result in a "cacophony of com-
peting voices." ld., at 376. 
Finally, the Commission urges that its prohibition would 
prevent ratepayers from subsidizing the costs of policy-
oriented bill inserts. But the Commission did not base 
its order on an inability to allocate costs between the share-
h0lders of Consolidated Edison and the ratepayers. Rather, 
the Commission stated "that using bill inserts to proclaim a 
utility 's viewpoint on controversial issues (even when the 
stockholder pays for it in full) is tantamount to taking ad-
vantage of a captive audience . . . . " App. to Juris. St. , at 
43a (emphasis added). Accordingly, there is no basis on this 
record to assume that the Commission could not exclude the 
cost of these bill inserts from the utility's rate base.12 Mere 
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speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling state 
interest. See Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 389 
u.s. 217, 222-223 (1967).13 
IV 
The Commission's suppression of bill inserts that discuss 
controversial issues of public policy directly infringes the 
freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The state action is neither a va..lid time, place, 
or manner restriction, nor a permissible subject-matter regu-
lation, nor a narrowly drawn prohibition justified by a com-
pelling state interest. Accordingly, the regulation is invalid, 
F-irst National Bank of Boston v. Bellott·i, 435 U. S., at 795. 
The decision of the New York Court of · Appeals is 
Reversed, 
that it would impose the ban without regard to allocation of costs between 
shareholders and ratepayers. App., at 67a, n. 1. 
18 The Commission also contends that ratepayers cannot be forced to 
support the costs of Consolidated Edison's bill inserts . Because the Com-
mission has failed to demonstrate that such costs could not be allocated 
between shareholders and ratepayers, we have no occasion to decide 
whether the rule of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 20!) 
(1977), would prevent Consolidated Edison from passing on to ratepayers 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 79-134, Consolidated Edison v. PSC 
Justice Blackmun has circulated an additional footnote 
to his dissent taking issue with Justice Marshall's statement in 
his concurrence that the "forced subsidy" issue was relied upon 
by the Commission. And he has quoted a footnote to the 
Commission's decision on rehearing which, he claims, 
demonstrates that the forced subsidy issue was considered. 
We cite the same footnote for the opposit~oposition. 
In note twelve, the Court's opinion states: "In its denial of 
petitions for rehearing, the Commission re-emphasized that it 
would impose the ban without regard to allocation of costs 
2. 
betwen shareholders and ratepayers." Curiously, Justice 
Blackmun has never attacked that footnote. 
I believe that our read inq is correct. The footnote 
states that the utility qets an advantaqe "even if an allocation 
of the expenses could be made." The footnote then refers, a bit 
ambiguously, to a non-economic unfair advantage gained by the 
utility. The only such advantage explicitly identified by the 
Commission is the utility's ability to take advantage of a 
captive audience. And even if this footnote is ambiguous in its 
entirety, it does not explicitly reject the statement from the 
first Commission decision, quoted on page 12, that the decision 
would stand even if the stockholder paid for the insert in full. 
Janet Cooper, Justice Marshall's clerk on this case, 
came by today to seek advice on whether Justice Marshall should 
respond to Justice Blackmun's added footnote. We thought that no 
response was necessary by Justice Marshall since the footnote on 
~s face does not appear to support Justice Blackmun's 
interpretation. Nor do I believe any response need be added to 
the Court's opinion. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~upttutt ~tmrl of tqt ~nittb ~httte 
·~r:tillrhtgteu. ~. ~· 2rrbi,.~ 
MEMORANDUM TG -THE CONFERENCE 
June 13, 1980 
Re: No. 79-134 - Consolidated Edison of New York, Inc. 
v. Public Service Commission of New York 
In my dissenting op1n1on, I shall add the following as a new 
footnote appended to the first sentence of Part II on page 4: 
1/ MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL in his concurring opinion, 
states: "The Commission did not rely on the argument 
that the use of bill inserts required ratepayers to 
subsidize the dissemination of management's view in 
issuing its order, and we therefore are precluded from 
sustaining the order on that ground." Ante, at 1. 
I cannot agree that the Commission did not rely on 
the "forced subsidy" justification. In its opinion 
denying petitions for rehearing, the Commission stated: 
"We note also that where the ratepayer's bill 
is accompanied by politica l advertisement, the 
political material is, abse nt allocation, get-
ting a free ride; the utility is deriving the 
economic benefit of postage, envelope, labor 
and overhead involved in the billing process. 
And even if an allocation of the expenses could 
be made , the actual cost of enclosing suc h 
material in the bill itself does not approach 
the one-sided benefi t t o the managemen t of 
being able to use the unique billing process in 
presenting its side of tlie controversy. It is 
certainly questionable whethe r ratepayers 
should be compelled to support views with which 
they do no t agree . See Abood v. Detroit Board 
of Education, [431 U.S. 209] (1977) ." App. to 










lfp/ss 6/19/80 79-134 Consolidated Edison v. 
Public Service Commission 
This is ~n appeal;lfrom the Court of Appeals of New 
York. The appellant, an electric utility, placed a printed 
~~ 
insert in its billing envelope~sent to its customers . ~~t 
emphasized the benefits of nuclear power. Appellee,j the 
1-l.t(P·ubl ic Service Commission / thereafter issued an order/_ 
J\ ~,(,~ - W'iZ4 h:.u4..J-
prohibiting pnbll Yice companies from includingl\ inserts 
i~ ei~~ QR\~~es that discuss - and here I quote -
"controversial issues of public importance". 
Appellant challenged the validity of this 
~' arguing that it violates the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The New York Court of Appeals, advancing several 
different grounds, sustained its validity. 
We take a different view. A ban - even one 
~blic utility companies - on the discussion of 
1 . 
importanceJ'directly infringes controversial issues of public 









The Commission's order/ is neither a valid time, 
place or manner restriction; nor is it a permissibleJ'subject 
matter regulation; nor) a narrowly drawn prohibitio;!justified 
by a compelling state interest. 
Accordingly, the decision of the New York Court of 
Appeals is reversed. 
Mr. Justice Marshall has filed a concurring 
opinion. Mr. Justice Stevens has filed an opinion concurring 
in the judgment. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun has filed a dissenting 
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The right of an electric company to extol nuclear 
power in its billing envelope is not a treasured Ameri-
can liberty. Nor will eXtra rockets be fired on July 4 for 
a utility's right to promote electricity consumption. · 
Yet the Sup~me f;ourt is surely right to rule that the 
political and commercial messages are protected by 
the First Amendrilent from Government prohibition. , 
The prohibitions• in queStion both came from New 
York's Public Service Commission. It ordered Consoli- · 
dated Edison. not to clutter its billing envelopes with 
any political .or social messages. And it told Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric not to entice customers into· 
using more electric ,power. Both orders, though well-
intentioned, were too sweeping. The Court correctly ob-
served that the order against Con Ed put government 
in the position of choosing which issues are worth dis-
cussing or debating. Customers are not a captive audi-
ence; they can throw the unwanted message into the 
waste basket. The particular insert the Court was con-. 
sidering cost the customer nothing. . . 
The Court recognized a stronger government inter-
est - energy conservation - in the Centrai Hudson 
case. That utility's argument )Vas weaker than Con 
·' I .. 
. ' 
Ed's becau.Se commercial advertising has not won as 
much protection as political speech. Still, a total ban on 
promotional messages went too far. Some justices also 
perceived some political content, worthy of full consti-
tutional protection, even in the utility's "commercial" 
message. 
Utilities, however, may well wonder if they have 
real~y won this battle when they learn that the Court 
has 'suggested the prior screening of advertising as one 
way of lawfully regulating what the companies say. 
·: Those regulators have great power over utilities-
to set rates, allocate costs and influence patterns of 
energy production and consumption. To .give them 
power also over how utilities can express themselves 
may make their job easier. But the co!it '.would be too 
great in lost freedom. Besides, recent Supreme Court 
decisions promoting corporate and commercial speech 
have helped many ordinary consumers ·as much as 
they have helped giant corporations - by letting law-
yers and pharmacists advertise low rates, for exam-
ple. Freedom of speech in commerce does have its an-
noyances and risks. But it is better than government 
control of the market in ideas. 
I 
'. 
